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This thesis examines the roles of the Royal Navy in
British security policy. Since World War Two, Britain's role
in the international system has changed and so has its
security policy. Today Britain plays a part in the nuclear
balance of power; is a major contributor to NATO and West
European collective security; and has diminished but still
significant interests beyond Europe. The Royal Navy contributes
to each of these dimensions of Britain's defense policy. It
operates Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Its con-
ventional forces contribute to Britain's European commitment,
though the Navy's role is currently considered less signifi-
cant than that of the British Army and the RAF. Finally, the
Royal Navy plays a role in protecting Britain's residual
global interests such as the Falklands. The future of the
Navy is ultimately dependent upon the constraints which limit
defense resources. In the future the Royal Navy will continue
to operate the strategic nuclear deterrent; will contribute
to Britain's European role with diminished capability; and
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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 31, 1916, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe steamed into
battle off Jutland with one of the greatest fighting forces
in history, the British Grand Fleet. Boasting twenty-eight
dreadnought battleships and nine battlecruisers as well as
over ninety cruisers and destroyers, this fleet marked the
zenith of British naval power. The spirit of Drake, Effingham,
Hood, Rodney, Howe, and Nelson, and a tradition of 300 years
of naval supremacy were embodied in that fleet. Britannia
ruled the waves around the world.
Sixty- six years later Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward went
into battle off the Falkland Islands with what was now the
embodiment of British seapower: one old helicopter/VSTOL
carrier due for retirement, one light carrier already sold to
Australia and just over a dozen destroyers and frigates.
Britannia ruled the waves around those remote islands only
with great difficulty.
The decline of the Royal Navy has not occurred in a vacuum,
but has merely been a symptom of the great historical decline
of Britain as a world power. The economic growth of Germany
and the United States, the impact of two world wars, the
emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as super-
powers, and the development of nuclear weapons have profoundly
altered Britain's economic, political, and military roles in
the world.

The seeds of the Navy's decline were being sown even as
Jellicoe engaged the German High Seas Fleet in battle. The
United States and Japan were beginning naval build-up programs
that spurred a postwar naval race. Britain finished the war
with a large but obsolescent fleet, and war costs made
competing in a new naval race out of the question. The race
was halted until the late 1930' s by the 1922 Washington Naval
Conference but Britain, by accepting a 5:5:3 ratio in capital
ships, had acknowledged United States naval equality.
World War Two proved a traumatic experience for the Royal
Navy, and profoundly altered its role in the world. As in
the First World War, the German U-boat threat again nearly
knocked Britain out of the war. The Navy found its forces
overstretched by commitments. In addition to containing
German raiders and combatting U-boats, the Navy fought a very
close-run campaign in the Mediterranean, all with a Navy which
only numbered a fourth of the capital ships which it had had
in the previous war. When Japan threatened the British position
in the Far East, the Royal Navy was unable to send the fleet
promised during the interwar period. As a result, Japan
swept through Malaya and Burma and seized Singapore. By 1945,
the Royal Navy's battlefleet, which had entered the war
unsurpassed in strength by any other navy, was only another
task force in the United States Pacific Fleet. America now
ruled the waves.
After the war, the Royal Navy adjusted to its position
as the second largest navy in the world, but by the Sixties

it found itself surpassed by the Soviet Navy as well. The
end of the Empire and a series of financial retrenchments
further reduced the Navy till by the 1980s it was barely
keeping ahead of the French fleet.
The present roles of the Royal Navy in British security
policy are a reflection of Britain's role in the world. That
role can best be examined in three principal areas, that of
the nuclear deterrent, European collective security, and
global interests and commitments. It is within these three
areas that the Navy finds its roles. The Royal Navy is the
primary operator of Britain's strategic deterrent. The Royal
Navy's conventional forces make up the largest European navy
in NATO's force structure, and the Navy bears the principal
burden of projecting British power beyond Europe. The
relationship between these roles, however, is shaped not only
by military strategy and requirements, but the severe con-
straints placed on British resources. Nevertheless, the
Royal Navy continues to play an important role in Britain's
nuclear deterrent, the British contribution to NATO and
European security, and Britain's reduced but still significant
global interests.

II. GREAT BRITAIN'S ROLE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD
Great Britain entered the twentieth century as the most
powerful nation in the world. The British Empire covered a
fourth of the world's land surface and ruled a third of its
population. The Royal Navy ruled the waves, as it had for
over 300 years. London was the world's financial center, as
British industry and trade had made Britain the richest nation
in the world. Queen Victoria, in the sixty-third year of her
reign, symbolized the continuity and prestige of British
power. After eighty-five years of Pax Britannica, the
British entered the new century supremely confident.
As Britain enters the 1980' s its position in the world
is a far cry from that eighty years earlier. The once mighty
British Empire now consists only of the British Isles (minus
most of Ireland), Gibraltar, Hong Kong, the Falklands, and a
few assorted islands in the Pacific, Indian and South Atlantic
Oceans. The United States and the Soviet Union now vie for
status as the most powerful nation in the world, each boasting
many times Britain's power. Economically, Britain has become
the "sick man of Europe." The power and prestige of
Victorian England is now only a memory.
The roots of Britain's decline go back to the middle of
the nineteenth century, when the industrial revolution spread
to other nations. The United States and Germany above all
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industrialized on a scale which threatened to dwarf British
industry. The British economic advantage was clearly eroding
by the time war broke out in 1914.
The First World War was the first of the great traumas
which brought Britain to her present status. Over 900,000
Britons were killed and another 2,000,000 wounded, compromising
much of Britain's future leadership. War costs and damages
2
of nearly US $52 billion changed Britain from a creditor
nation to a debtor nation. Although Germany had been tempo-
rarily eliminated as an economic and military rival, the
United States was now the world's creditor with by far the
world's richest economy. Finally, the Royal Navy's failure
to fulfill the Trafalgar legend by destroying the German High
Seas Fleet at Jutland brought into question the credibility
of British naval supremacy, the bedrock on which British
power rested. An exhausted Great Britain's decline had begun.
During the interwar years the British attempted to carry
on as before, yet the cracks in British power continued to
grow. Faced with an intense naval race between the United
States and Japan in which Britain could not compete, the
British government agreed at the 1922 Washington Naval
Conference to a 5:5:3 ratio of capital ships for Britain, the
United States, and Japan respectively. Thus, by acknowledging
U.S. naval equality, Great Britain's 300 year-old tradition
of naval supremacy ended. In India, a nationalist movement
led by M. K. Gandhi threatened British rule at the very heart
11

of the Empire. At home, economic problems, particularly the
Great Depression, sapped the confidence of the British people.
The events of the late 1930's, in which Britain lacked the
will or ability to stop Hitler, demonstrated the fundamental
weakness of the nation. By 1939 Britain was even weaker than
in 1918.
In 1939, Britain found itself at war again. This Second
World War proved even more traumatic for Britain than the
first. The BEF was driven from the continent and the British
Isles threatened with invasion. British cities were pounded
by the Luftwaffe. As in the First World War, German U-boats
threatened the British with starvation, while the Royal Navy
found itself overstretched by its commitments. Substantial
territories of the British Empire were overrun by the Japanese.
Although Britain was victorious, victory was due more to the
destruction of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union and the
massive intervention of the United States. Indeed, after
Normandy, Britain's role as an ally equal to the United States
and the Soviet Union steadily declined. Finally, the de-
struction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic weapons brought
into the international arena a new yardstick by which national
power would be measured, and Britain did not have these weapons
If Britain had at. least shared the top rung of power in 1939,




After the war emerged a new world order dominated by two
"superpowers", the United States and the Soviet Union.
Britain sought to maintain a role one notch below the two
superpowers. However, chronic and severe economic problems
at home and growing nationalism throughout the Empire made
such a position increasingly untenable. What was followed in
the nearly four decades since the Second World War have been
repeated attempts to maintain as strong a position as possible
while repeatedly attempting to redefine Great Britain's role
in the world. Dean Acheson's oft quoted view that "Britain
4has lost an empire and has not yet found a role" has con-
tinued to be true as Britain continues to retreat from its
former position of power.
As Britain moves through the 1980' s it continues to play
a role in three major arenas of power, the nuclear balance,
the European continent, and to a much lesser extent the world
stage. The size of the British roles in these areas continues
to change as the Government continues to make decisions
concerning the allotment of scarce resources. Therefore,
the British role must be tailored to fit the available national
power.
Britain, as a global power in decline, has reduced its
role in the international political system to match its
decline in national power. Accordingly, Britain maintains a
small but significant stake in the nuclear balance of power,
a substantial position in West European security, and a small,
but not negligible role worldwide.
13

A. BRITAIN AND THE NUCLEAR BALANCE
Nuclear weapons have played a central role in British
security policy since 1945. Whether or not Britain should
be a nuclear power, and if so, what form its nuclear force
should take has been and continues to be a major issue for
the British government and people.
British involvement with nuclear weapons goes back to the
Second World War, when the British assisted with the Manhattan
Project. Although Churchill and Roosevelt had a private
agreement by which the United States would share its atomic
secrets with Britain, that arrangement died with Roosevelt.
The MacMahon Act of 1946 prevented the sharing of atomic
secrets with any nation, including the United Kingdom.
Although the American need for uranium from Britain's African
colonies caused a loosening of restrictions in 1947, another
decade passed before general sharing between the two nations
took place. Therefore, Britain was largely dependent on its
own resources to develop atomic weapons. This it did,
exploding its first atomic bomb on October 3, 1952, and its
first hydrogen weapon on May 15, 1957. Britain had joined
the nuclear club.
Having joined that exclusive club, 3ritain then set out
to develop a nuclear force. Its roots lay in the Global
Strategic Paper of 1952, which emphasized both a strategic
nuclear airstrike capability and a tactical nuclear capability
The result was the V-bomber force of the 1950 's based on the
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VULCAN, VICTOR and VALIANT bombers. Although cooperation with
the American SAC was envisioned from the begining, the force
did allow the British some independence. The V-bombers con-
tinued to provide the backbone of the British nuclear
deterrent until the late 1960's.
Britain's desire to modernize and update its nuclear
forces led ultimately to technical dependence on the United
States. SPUTNIK and the development of ballistic missiles
caused the British government to begin development of a
British land-based missile, the BLUE STREAK. The expense of
such a program, however, combined with growing financial
constraints to cause the cancellation of the program in 1960.
Instead, the decision was made to purchase the American
SKYBOLT long-range Air- to-Surface missile then under develop-
ment. Great Britain was becoming dependent upon U.S. weapons
technology.
Britain's dependence on the United States has dramatically
demonstrated by the SKYBOLT Affair. The SKYBOLT came to
represent for the British their future as a nuclear power and
the centerpiece of Britain's military security. For the
United States, however, it was only another of a myriad of
strategic weapons in development or production. To Kennedy
and MacNamara, the decision to cancel the SKYBOLT program in
1962 was only a measure to improve the cost-effectiveness of
U.S. defense spending without any real weakening of the
American strategic force. For MacMillan and his government,
15

however, the decision was a betrayal by Britain's closest
ally and left the British nuclear force with a questionable
future. The problem was solved at the Nassau Conference in
December, 1962, when Kennedy offered MacMillan POLARIS. The
arrangement, by which the United States provided POLARIS
missiles and technical assistance on submarine construction
while the British built the submarines and nuclear warheads
themselves, gave the British an even more effective and
secure nuclear force than SKYBOLT, but made dependence on the
United States for nuclear weapons technology a permanent
feature of British defense policy.
The rationale behind the British nuclear force has re-
mained essentially unchanged since its inception. Despite
the peculiarly British lack of detailed public justification
for nuclear weapons, several reasons have been given at
various times by British leaders which give insight into the
thinking of Great Britain's policy elites.
The first reason for acquiring nuclear weapons was the
prestige and status which nuclear weapons confer on a nation.
Initially, British leaders saw nuclear weapons as a way to
maintain a degree of equality with the other nuclear powers,
the United States and the Soviet Union. As other nations
have also acquired nuclear weapons and the nuclear arsenals
of the two superpowers have dwarfed the British arsenal,
Britain's weapons still make the British a party to many
nuclear matters. Also, Britain possesses a certain status as
16

the only European nuclear power in the integrated NATO military
structure. "Below the positions of the superpowers, the
British - like the French - realized that nuclear weapons
could be used to differentiate their nation from almost all
others in the world." The prestige and self-confidence
which nuclear weapons give Britain continue to motivate
British leaders toward maintaining membership in the nuclear
club.
Secondly, a British nuclear force provided insurance
should the United States again fail to become directly involved
in a European War. In the immediate postwar years, memories
of 1939-1941 greatly affected British perceptions of America's
attitude toward Europe. Since that time, however, little has
been publicly said by the government about such a scenario.
While DeGaulle was loudly proclaiming the American nuclear
guarantee was no longer viable, successive British governments
have continued to express complete confidence in the American
promises. Instead, the British have cloaked their "Gaullist"
feelings by suggesting their deterrent prevents the Soviets
from "miscalculating" that the U.S. guarantee was no longer
viable and therefore starting a war. Recently, however, some
have hinted at the possibility of an American loss of will,
particularly in light of Soviet strategic parity. Yet, the
alue Britain places on its relationship with the United States
ill continue to keep such concerns more a private than public





A third justification, closely related to the second, is
the value of an independent center for decisionmaking. The
British feel that more centers of nuclear decisionmaking in
the Western Alliance increase the uncertainty for and therefore
deterrence of the Soviet Union. Initially the British also
claimed that their targeting priorities might vary from the
Americans', such as naval bases and submarine pens, but with
the growth of the U.S. arsenal and the decline of British
seapower, such explanations have become outmoded. Independent
decisionmaking does, however, require the Soviets to pay
particular attention to British motives and interests.
Accordingly, although the British strategic force is assigned
to NATO, the British government reserves for itself the
decision on when to go nuclear and under what circumstances
that decision would be made. Despite its technical dependence
on the United States, the British deterrent is controlled
solely by the British themselves, a fact which continues to
justify its existence.
A fourth reason for a British nuclear force borrows from
the French "proportional deterrence" philosophy. Essentially,
the British hold that their force could do more damage to an
attacker, i.e. the Soviet Union, than would justify any gains
he would derive from destroying the United Kingdom. Former
Secretary of State for Defense John Nott stated in 1982,
"Deterrence, and preventing war, is a matter of showing that
the risks involved in starting a war are seen by a potential
IS

aggressor as far greater than any possible gains he could hope
7
to achieve." As long as the British deterrent remains on
relatively invulnerable submarines, and retains the ability to
penetrate Soviet defenses (as the CHEVALINE warhead improvement
program and the TRIDENT program intends to maintain) , this
form of reasoning provides sound justification for such a
force
.
Support for Britain's nuclear deterrent has generally
been bi-partisan, though not unanimous. In the Labour Party
particularly, there has always been an anti-nuclear and anti-
military faction, motivated by pacifism, sympathy for the
Soviet Union, or the desire for more social spending. A
segment of the British populace in general has held objections
to nuclear weapons on moral grounds. The anti-nuclear move-
ment reached its peak in the late 1950 ? s when the Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament gained enough influence to get a resolution
in favor of unilateral nuclear disarmament passed by the 1960
Labour Party Conference. The Party leadership, however, was
cool to disarmament and succeeded in eliminating it from the
Party agenda. When Labour achieved power in 1964, the Wilson
Government continued the nuclear weapons policies of the Tories
without much outcry. Nuclear disarmament lost public promi-
nence during the 1960's and 1970's, but the early 1980 T s have
seen a resurgence of the anti-nuclear movement. Though this
movement opposes TRIDENT, it appears more immediately aimed
at American nuclear arms in Europe rather than British weapons,
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and the Thatcher Government's plans to acquire TRIDENT have
met with less public outcry than U. S . -controlled weapons.
Despite the shift to the left of Labour, the chances that the
strife-torn party will take power and alter British nuclear
policy in the near future are dim. As long as the Tory
Government remains committed to TRIDENT and there is no mass
public opposition to a British deterrent, Britain will remain
a nuclear power.
Britain's involvement with arms control has been mixed.
The British were strong advocates for the Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty. Although the British government still supports a
comprehensive test-ban treaty, its ardor for such a treaty has
been cooled by the necessity to develop warheads for a suc-
cessor to POLARIS. The British are also sensitive to charges
that their American nuclear relationship violates the Non-
Proliferat ion Treaty, though Britain builds its own warheads.
Finally Britain refuses to take part in SALT, START, or any
negotiations on its own strategic forces, unless the Soviet
nuclear arsenal is significantly reduced, as the British force
is too small to stand any reductions in the face of overwhelming
Soviet superiority.
The future of Britain as a nuclear power will depend on
its ability to provide financial support for its force. Once
built, the British POLARIS fleet has proved very economical
in service and will remain effective through the 1980' s.
Whether Britain's declining resources will support the
20

construction of a replacement remains to be seen. The TRIDENT
decision, by which the British would build the submarines and
warheads, while the United States would provide missiles and
technical assistance, provides the British with the most cost-
o
effective long-term replacement. The Thatcher Government is
determined to procure the system, but past governments have
been forced to cancel "sacred" programs due to economic
stringencies. The future of the British deterrent, as the
rest of the defense establishment, will depend on the success
of the Government in improving Britain's economic position.
Ultimately, however, Britain will remain dependent on the
American nuclear arsenal, in which it has placed so much faith,
B. BRITAIN AND EUROPE
One of the greatest changes in Britain's foreign policy
since the Second World War has been in the nature of its
relationship with Europe. Its policy toward Europe reflects
not only its view toward its allies, but also its self-image
as to its own role in Western security.
Historically, Britain has tried to remain aloof from
European affairs, becoming involved only when one power
threatened to achieve continental hegemony. Britain would
then align itself with the opponents of that power, forming
coalitions to stop it. The separation provided by the English
Channel combined with the Royal Navy to protect the British
Isles from invasion, while preventing any power from gaining
hegemony insured that the Europeans would be too pre-occupied
21

with continental affairs to seriously threaten the British
Empire. British foreign policy continued to be guided by
these principles until the end of the Second World War.
The realities of the post-war world ended any hopes of
"splendid isolation." Totalitarian control of Poland, which
Britain had fought Germany to prevent, was now accomplished
by the Soviet Union. The decline of the Royal Navy, the
development of airpower during the war, and the atomic bomb
greatly reduced the military value of the Channel. Finally,
Britain's decline relative to the United States and the
Soviet Union ultimately made Britain dependent on the United
States for its security.
In adjusting to this situation British policy has been
characterized by two frequently contrary trends. One trend
has been for a greater British involvement with and closer
ties to its West European allies. The other trend has been
for Britain to maintain a special position separate from
Europe and closer to the United States. These two trends
continue to the present in shaping Anglo-European relations.
In the immediate post-war period, wartime experience
combined with British perception of the Soviet threat in
Central Europe to make the idea of a European coalition very
popular in the United Kingdom. Winston Churchill himself
proposed a United States of Europe in 1946 at Zurich.
Accordingly, the British took a leading role in establishing
both the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the NATO Treaty a year
??

later. Furthermore, Britain committed a sizable military
force to a permanent position on the continent. This step
marked a great change over all previous British security
policy. The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) was originally
77,000 men, but was reduced to 55,000 in the late 1950's as
an economy measure. The BAOR and RAF Germany were established
initially to contain German revanchism as much as any Soviet
moves. By the mid 1950 's, however, the Soviet threat had
sufficiently supplanted the German threat to a degree that
Britain supported the re-armament of West Germany. The BAOR
had come to symbolize not only Great Britain's commitment to
preventing a Soviet move against the West, but also Britain's
involvement with its NATO allies and its interest in main-
taining a leading role in the NATO alliance. With the
elimination of Britain's global commitments, the BAOR has
come to demand an ever growing percentage of British defense
spending. The Thatcher Government's decision to drastically
reduce the Royal Navy in order to maintain the BAOR is
evidence of the priority now placed on the NATO commitment.
The British military commitment in Central Europe continues
to be a major feature of British security policy.
British involvement with Europe has not only been
military but economic as well. Britain's traditional de-
pendence on foreign trade and the dissolution of the Empire
as an economic unit (which the Commonwealth could not prevent)
caused Britain to turn toward Europe. In the late 1950's,
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however, Great Britain still had sufficient, economic ties to
the Empire and Commonwealth that it balked at the European
Economic Community (EEC) and its common external tariff.
Instead it established the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) , which consisted of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal,
Austria, and Switzerland as well as the United Kingdom. The
EFTA, however, lacked the economic potential or political
9bonds to be a rival to the EEC
,
so by 1961 the MacMillan
Government reversed the earlier decision to stay out of the
EEC and began negotiations to enter. These went on until
1963 when De Gaulle, claiming the British were not "European"
enough, announced he would veto British entry into the
Community. A second attempt in the late 1960's by Harold
Wilson met with a similar rebuff. But by 1971, De Gaulle
was gone and French fears of German dominance of the EEC
allowed the Heath Government to successfully petition for
entry. In 1973, Britain joined the EEC and became as econo-
mically committed to Europe as it was militarily.
Britain's involvement with Europe has not had unanimous
domestic support, and several reasons both for and against a
European orientation have appeared in policy debates.
Britain's NATO membership, and the United States' membership,
has committed the United States to Britain's defense, an
accomplishment considered by many to be the greatest achievement of
British foreign policy in this century. With the Soviet
Union perceived as the major threat, the 3A0R is seen as the
24

best way to contribute directly to containing that threat.
Also, the British presence on the continent gives it influence
in European affairs. Many British leaders, particularly in
the Conservative Party, have shown support for European Unity
as a goal in itself. This would give Britain a degree of
independence from the United States, and support for it has
fed on some anti-American feeling among the Tories as a result
of the process of de-colonization and the Suez Crisis. It
is significant that both the initial attempt to enter the EEC
and the final entry occurred during Tory governments. The
one attempt made by a Labour Government received the support
of the opposition party. Though Labour now opposes EEC
membership, the pro-European view has been the dominant view
of British policy.
Opposition to a greater role in Europe has continued,
particularly on the size of the military commitment and EEC
membership. Early arguments that the European commitment
undermined Britain's global position and its "special
relationship" with the United States have largely disappeared
as a result of the loss of Empire and decline of British
power. However, now that economic stringencies have forced
the Government to reduce the Royal Navy in order to maintain
the forces in Germany, opposition has grown - particularly in
the Labour Party - to such a move. Indeed, Labour has become
12the "Navy Party"! Many traditionalists of both parties have
expressed misgivings about abandoning Britain's naval traditions
25

for a continental position. In the aftermath of the Falklands
War, such opposition may eventually result in a reduction of
the Central European forces in favor of the Navy. On the
economic front, considerable dissatisfaction with the EEC
exists, particularly its agricultural pricing policies. Labour,
which has always been suspicious of the EEC as a threat to
domestic jobs, has particularly expressed unhappiness over
the EEC. This discontent has effectively ended any serious
13hopes of European unity. Concern over the costs of main-
taining the BAOR and unhappiness over the EEC do not seriously
threaten Britain's role in Europe, but do present the possi-
bility that it may limit the scope of British involvement in
the future.
However, Britain's future will continue to be in Europe.
Although a desire to have a global view exists, and enthusiasm
for the EEC has cooled, the decline of Britain's power, the
end of Empire, and the presence of the Soviet Union in Central
Europe will continue to make Europe the principal focal point
of British foreign policy.
C. BRITAIN AND THE WORLD
One of the most dramatic historical events of the post-war
world has been the dissolution of the British Empire. In only
twenty-five years history's greatest empire disappeared.
Although this was accomplished over an amazingly short period
of time and with amazingly little strife, it was by no means
26

a smooth, orderly, well-planned retreat. The collapse of the
Empire and its aftermath have defined British global policy
since 1945.
Despite Britain's weakened condition after 1945, most
British leaders felt that maintenance of the Empire was both
possible and desirable. For the Tories, who were the tra-
ditional party of Empire, support for maintaining it was
natural. For Labour, the party in power, sympathies were
more ambiguous. Traditionally, the socialist-oriented
Labourities had regarded the Empire as capitalist exploitation
Yet they were also British patriots comfortable with the
14habits of Empire. Furthermore, they were able to find a
moral justification for Empire. "There had always been two
strains, contrary strains, in British imperialism - the rough
aggressive strain and the other, more liberal one, which
sought genuinely to provide sound administration for under-
developed peoples." Labourities felt it their moral duty
to prepare their colonies for self-rule [and spread socialism
to these colonies) , a process which would proceed slowly and
carefully. As colonies received self-rule, they would remain
bound to the crown by the Commonwealth, which up to then had
only consisted of ethnically British nations such as
Australia and New Zealand. (South Africa, although not pre-
dominantly British ethnically, was at least dominated by
European peoples.) The first non-ethnically British colony




The granting of independence to India set the pattern of
retreat from Empire. India had become ungovernable as a
result of Gandhi's campaign of civil disobedience and the
non-violent aspects of Indian nationalism convinced many that
India was ready for self-government. Accordingly, Prime
Minister Clement Atlee sent Lord Mountbatten, an aristocratic
war hero with pro-Labour sympathies to India as Viceroy to
end the Raj . India would become a member of the Commonwealth,
though without recognizing the Crown as head-of -state . The
terms by which India entered, however, were such that the
Commonwealth soon evolved, with addition of other non-Anglo-
Saxon nations, into an organization without any real binding
ties diplomatically, militarily, or economically. Further-
more, the insistence of Indian Muslims, led by Mohammed Ali
Jinnah, on a separate Muslim state, and the outbreak of
religious violence following the independence of India and
Pakistan, disillusioned not only Gandhi and Mountbatten, but
many who believed in the process of decolonization. The most
important effect of granting independence to India, however,
was its impact upon the rest of the Empire. "The haphazard
spread of Britain's colonial possessions concealed an inner
17logic." That inner logic was the defense of India. Virtu-
ally every British possession except those in North America
and the West Indies were acquired for that purpose. With
India no longer the centerpiece of Empire, the remainder of
1
8
the colonies now came to be justified in their own right."

Winston Churchill and the Tories returned to power in 1951
determined to maintain those colonies. The futility of such
a goal was ignored. "The end of the Raj in India made the
19
end of Empire certain." British efforts to avoid that
certainty came to dominate British global policy.
In addition to internal pressures for decolonization, and
nationalist movements in the colonies, Britain was also under
great pressure to end its Empire from the superpowers, par-
ticularly the United States. "The United States was identified
as a major enemy of British imperial interests, possibly even
more dangerous than the Soviet Union because it was nominally
20
a friend and ally." Despite America's Anglophilism, it was
also anti- imperialist . Furthermore, the United States was
7 1
the shining example to colonial peoples in the postwar world. L
Britain's dependence upon the United States strategically
made it more vulnerable to American pressure. The British,
however, were fairly successful in dealing with this pressure
without damage to the "special relationship" until Suez. As
for the Soviet Union, although there existed total antipathy
between the United Kingdom and the USSR, the Soviets over-
estimated the strength of the British Empire and did little
to undermine it. Super power pressure in the decade following
the war, particularly from Britain's American ally, provided




Despite the retreat from India and Palestine, Britain
exercised its global power in the decade following the Second
World War as an imperial power as well as a member of the
Western alliance. Britain was a leading founder of SEATO and
CENTO, and used armed force in combatting the Communist revolt
in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and made a large
contribution to the UN forces in Korea. These successful
military operations concealed for many how dependent even
British global military power was on American cooperation.
But the events of October and November 1956 shattered that
image of Britain as an independent global actor.
The Suez Crisis of 1956 proved a watershed for British
global policy. For British policy-makers Nasser's seizure
of the Suez Canal struck a special chord because of memories
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of the desert campaigns of World War Two. ~ When attempts
at international mediation failed, the Eden Government, in
collusion with the French and Israelis, selected a military
option. Without warning Washington, Israel struck in the
Sinai while British and French airborne troops seized the canal
International outrage at the act was overwhelming. President
Eisenhower refused to support his two allies and demanded a
withdrawal, while Khrushchev threatened to "rain rockets on
London and Paris." The British and French were forced to
withdraw in ignominy. Eden resigned shortly thereafter due




The impact of that failure dramatically altered Britain's
global position. The reality of Britain's weakness and de-
pendence on the United States was vividly demonstrated. As
one obituary for Anthony Eden noted, "He was the last Prime
Minister to believe Britain was a great power and the first
23
to confront a crisis that proved she was not.""' After Suez,
the Anglo-American alliance became less and less a partnership
and more the protection of a small state by a large one.
Nasser's apparent victory over the British ended any hope of
24
maintaining an imperial position in Africa. Even at home
Suez had become a symbol of Empire, and its loss broke the
will to hold on to that Empire. Furthermore, the crisis
exposed the weakness of the Commonwealth, as only Australia
and New Zealand supported the British move. Anglophobia
among the Arabs, who had traditionally considered Britain as
a protector, was greatly fueled. By the end of 1956 Britain
found itself in a much more hostile world with a substantially
weaker perception of its power and a tarnished image. "On
the whole, the British bowed out of Empire gracefully. Suez
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was the particular occasion on which they did so ungracefully."
With Suez the sun finally began to set on the British Empire.
In the decade following Suez, the dismantling of Empire
was accomplished with remarkable speed. British power gave
way to national movements, even in colonies where the ability
to conduct "responsible, democratic self-government" was
questionable at best. Ghana received independence in 1957,

followed by Cyprus in 1959. In 1960 Nigeria, in 1961 Sierra
Leone and Tanganyika, and in 1962 Uganda all became independent
By 1967 Britain was out of Africa, with Kenya, Zanzibar in
1963, Malawi and Zambia in 1964, Gambia in 1965, and Botswana
and Lesotho in 1966 receiving their independence. The white
settlers in Rhodesia in 1965 unilaterally declared their
independence from Britain, to which Britain only responded
with economic sanctions. South Africa's withdrawal from the
Commonwealth in 1961 further weakened British influence in
Africa. At the same time, British colonial power and in-
fluence in the Arabian peninsula was also ended. The 1967
withdrawal from Aden and the 1971 granting of independence to
the United Arab Emirates ended Britain's traditional role in
the Persian Gulf. Throughout the 1960 's and 1970' s, even
colonies thought too small for independence, such as Malta,
Anguilla, Bermuda, and Mauritius also became independent.
The British Empire became history.
Despite Suez and the subsequent flood of decolonizations,
Great Britain entered the 1960's determined to remain a power
with significant global interests. Though the 1957 Defence
White Paper had placed heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons over
conventional forces and some retrenchment took place in the
British defense establishment, Britain still possessed a
considerable navy and other power projection forces. Both
Harold MacMillan and his successor Harold Wilson attempted to
maintain British power east of Suez. Emphasis was placed on
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mobile forces centered around Britain's aging carrier fleet,
and those forces intervened in several Asian and African
crises, most notably in Kuwait in 1961, which prevented an
attack by Iraq, Malaysia in 1963-66, and Kenya in 1964.
However, the financial crisis of 1966 ended Britain's global
ambitions. A new aircraft carrier program to replace Britain's
aging fleet was cancelled, and forces in the Indian Ocean and
in Malaya were greatly reduced. Britain needed severe fi-
nancial retrenchment and its global position became expendable.
The historic Defence White Paper of 1968 finally ended
Britain's role "East of Suez." By 1971 Britain's permanent
military presence east of Suez consisted only of the small
garrison in Hong Kong and a few administrative personnel in
Singapore and some assorted islands. Britain's global power
had ended.
Since 1971 Britain's global interests have been largely
limited to trade, its few remaining colonies, and its
ostensible leader of the Commonwealth, a role which provides
little real influence. However, two events at the end of
the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's pushed Britain
back onto the world's center stage. The first was the
resolution of the Rhodesian crisis in 1979. By force of
personality, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington forced
a solution to the Rhodesian civil war which at one time gave
the world the spectacle of a black African parliment voting
itself out of existence to be replaced by a white colonial
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government. There, British troops were involved in insuring
a free election. Though Britain withdrew after the settlement,
it proved itself still able to act in Africa. The second
crisis occurred when Argentina seized the Falklands in 1982.
Britain responded by retaking the islands with an outstanding
example of power projection and a short victorious war. Even
after its global retreat, Britain could still make itself
felt around the world.
Despite these last two episodes the prospects of Britain
again becoming a significant global power are very dim. The
Rhodesian affair was more a residue from the end of Empire
than a new interest in imperial goals. Although the British
government currently is expressing its determination to hold
the Falklands, protecting those small islands and maintaining
small garrisons in Hong Kong, Cyprus, Belize, and Gibraltar
will certainly stretch Britain's diminished resources. In-
deed, Britain's financial weakness has made global power a
luxury it can no longer afford. "Reinstatement of the former
British presence 'East of Suez' ... is no longer either a
political or an economic possibility... resource constraints
and our primary responsibility to NATO rule out any idea of
? 7
creating a substantial standing 'intervention force ' ."
Although Britain still has the power to intervene in special
circumstances such as the Falklands, Britain's era as a
global actor of any significance has ended.
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British foreign policy since 1945 has been shaped by
changes in the international system. The development of
nuclear weapons, the dramatic alteration of the European
system, and the end of European empires have determined that
policy. Furthermore, Britain's efforts to adjust to these
changes have been greatly affected by its economic decline.
"The history of British defense policy is of an attempt to
reconcile the mismatch between resources and commitments . "
This explains not only the end of the global role, but the
nature and extent of nuclear weapons policy and the European
commitment. As financial problems continue, so will the
strictures on British security policy.
The cornerstone of British foreign policy since 1941 has
been its "special relationship" with the United States. This
relationship has survived the widening gulf between the two
powers since World War Two, and has affected British nuclear,
European and global policy. British nuclear weapons have
given it special status among America's allies, and technical
cooperation has been one of the strongest bonds of the relation
Britain's NATO role has achieved the major accomplishment of
tying the United States to Britain's defense. Britain's
global role, which conflicted with American policy at least
during the first two decades after the war, has been sacrificed
to economy. British foreign policy has and will continue to
reflect the priority placed on the "special relationship."
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As Britain looks to the future, it faces certain dilemmas
in all three policy areas. The need to replace the aging
POLARIS force at a time of financial difficulties and an anti-
nuclear revival has again brought Britain's deterrent to the
center of policy debates. Those same financial strigencies
and the growing divergence between the United States and
Western Europe are causing a reappraisal of Britain's European
role. Finally, although Empire is no longer an issue, some
lingering problems such as the Falklands and the future of
Hong Kong must also be addressed by British policy makers.
Presently, Britain remains committed to both nuclear forces
and to NATO involvement and its willingness to project its
power beyond Europe if necessary. The framework Britain uses
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III. THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE
BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT
The first major arena of power which involves the Royal
Navy is that of the nuclear balance of power. The Royal Navy
today has exclusive responsibility for the British strategic
nuclear deterrent. This responsibility was once the domain
of the Royal Air Force and its VULCAN, VICTOR, and VALIANT
bombers, but after the SKYBOLT affair and the Nassau Conference,
the role began shifting from the RAF to the Navy. By the
early 1980s, the strategic nuclear strike role of the VULCAN
bombers with their BLUE STEEL nuclear stand-off missiles had
been phased out. The Royal Navy had become sole operator of
Britain's strategic forces.
The strategic deterrent role has become a primary function
of the Navy. As the fleet's other capabilities continue to
decline, the nuclear forces have taken on increasing importance.
"The operation of the strategic force will remain the Royal
Navy's first and most vital task for Britain's security."
The instrument of the Navy's nuclear deterrent has been,
and will continue to be, the nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) . This type of force gives Britain's a sur-
vivable second strike capability which is considered necessary
to maintain an effective deterrent. Britain's decision to
replace the POLARIS force with TRIDENT reflects the favorable
attitude of British policymakers toward the SSBN. The Royal
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Navy's POLARIS submarines have provided Britain's strategic
nuclear deterrent since the late sixties, and TRIDENT SLBMs
will provide such a deterrent into the next century.
A. POLARIS
Britain has been involved with POLARIS since the Nassau .
Conference of 1962. Prime Minister Harold MacMillan and his
advisors came to Nassau feeling betrayed and distressed by the
Kennedy-MacNamara decision to cancel SKYBOLT. Kennedy suc-
cessfully solved the British dilemma by offering to sell them
the American POLARIS submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) and technical assistance on submarine construction.
The British accepted the offer, and the Royal Navy gained the
role of operating Britain's strategic deterrent.
The terms of the agreement allowed Britain to take full
advantage of American research and development for a sea-based
deterrent. Under the agreement Britain would buy 100 POLARIS
A3 missiles from the United States, and the Americans would
provide extensive technical assistance in SSBN design and
construction, and weapons system fire control. Britain would
build the submarines and design and build the nuclear war-
heads for the missiles. This arrangement permitted Britain
to build an effective SSBN force at far less cost than if
Britain had designed and built everything itself.
One of the major issues concerning the program was the
number of submarines to be built. Recognizing the need to
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overhaul, repair, and refit the boats from time to time, and
the vulnerability of submarines in port, Britain's leaders
faced the requirement to have a portion of the force on
deterrent patrol at all times. If the force contained only
three boats, there would be periods when no boats were on
station. If a four-boat force was built, at least one would
always be on station, and a five-boat force would permit
2Britain to keep two boats on station at all times.
Accordingly, the British programme originally involved
building five submarines, but in 1965, the Wilson Government
cancelled the fifth boat as an economy measure. This left
the deterrent with no margin against accidental loss of a
boat. Fortunately, Britain has successfully avoided such an
occurrence. "Since 1969 there has never been a moment when
our Polaris force did not have at least one submarine on
patrol, effectively invulnerable to preemptive attack and at
high readiness to launch its missiles if required." The
four boat number has met Britain's needs.
Since the first SSBN entered service in 1967, the British
POLARIS force has been very successful in service. The force
consists of four submarines, RESOLUTION, RENOWN, REPULSE, and
REVENGE, each displacing 8,400 tons submerged, and armed with
4
sixteen POLARIS A3 missiles as well as torpedo tubes. Through
careful material management, no major accidents or equipment
failures have occurred. Furthermore, operating costs have
been kept down to approximately 100 million pounds per year
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in 1976 prices. Ultimately, however, the performance of
POLARIS is best measured by the fact that it has performed
its sole mission, deterrence against nuclear attack, suc-
cessfully since it entered service.
Since the late 1970s, the POLARIS force has undergone a
major improvement program. This program, called CHEVALINE,
involves improving the penetration ability of warhead against
an ABM defense. Before CHEVALINE, each POLARIS missile
mounted a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) of three 200 kiloton
(TNT equivalent) warheads. Although little is publicly known
about CHEVALINE, it has a MRV capable with "... hardened,
maneuvering, and early separating re-entry vehicles with
advanced decoys as penetration aids." The cost of this
program exceeded a billion pounds, but it extended the
effectiveness of POLARIS into the next decade. However, even
CHEVALINE is only a short-term improvement and does not
address the long-term future of Britain's nuclear deterrent,
B. THE NEED FOR A REPLACEMENT
No weapon system, however successful, can be expected to
perform its mission forever, and POLARIS is no exception. Age
of equipment, service wear and tear, and technological progress
combine to shorten the effective life-span of the POLARIS
force. Furthermore, the end of the U.S. Navy's POLARIS fleet
has drastically reduced the economy of scale for replacement
parts and modifications which the British have until recently
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enjoyed. Several factors are working to make the replacement
of POLARIS necessary.
The first factor which works to limit the POLARIS force's
future is the age of equipment. The four submarines, all of
which entered service between 1967 and 1969, have a service
life of twenty to twenty-five years, with thirty years pos-
7
sible with proper maintenance. Both the hulls and the
machinery show wear as they remain in operation. Age also
affects the missile components, particularly rocket fuel.
Although schemes such as freezing fuel in storage have been
considered, with Britain as the only user of POLARIS, the
cost of maintaining fuel supplies for the missiles will rise
as time goes on. By the early 1990s, age of equipment and
components will be a major problem for the POLARIS force.
In addition to age, the advance of technology also
threatens the POLARIS force's future. Advancements in ASW
technology and capabilities have increased the vulnerability
of the British SSBNs, which do not have the advantage of a
decade's improvement in submarine silencing. Recent Soviet
developments in air defense weapons and renewed interest in
ballistic missile defense have promoted growing doubts about
even a CHEVALINE-modif ied POLARIS weapon succeeding in
striking its target. "All the available evidence converges,
therefore, to suggest that, by some time in the early 1990's,
both Britain's submarines and their missiles will reach the
end of the road."
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In addition to age and obsolescence, the British are also
confronted with the prospect of sharply increasing costs for
operating the POLARIS force. This is a result of the phasing
out of POLARIS in the United States Navy. Although the United
States is obligated by the Nassau Agreement to provide support
for the British POLARIS force as long as it remains in service,
the cost of maintaining production capability for spare parts
will fall solely on Britain. The availability of out-of-
service U.S. equipment and spares may help for a short period
of time, but offers no long-term parts support. Furthermore,
any further modernization of the POLARIS system would require
Britain to fund all the research and development costs.
Maintaining the POLARIS force beyond the next decade is both
economically and militarily unfeasible.
C. THE CRUISE MISSILE ALTERNATIVE
When a British Government began searching for a replacement
for POLARIS in the late 1970s, one particularly attractive
alternative was the cruise missile. Land, air, or surface
ship-based weapons of any kind were dismissed as being too
vulnerable to preemptive strike, but the idea of submarine-
launched cruise missiles merited serious consideration. The
cruise missile was ultimately turned down, but only after
considerable debate.
The cruise missile alternative generated a considerable
amount of support. That Britain's chief ally, the United
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States, had embarked on a massive cruise missile program
enhanced the credibility of such a system. Furthermore, the
cruise missile seemed to offer several real advantages. First,
the unit cost of a cruise missile is far less than that of a
ballistic missile. Second, the cruise missile offers po-
tentially greater accuracy than the ballistic missile. Finally,
the cruise missile is relatively small and easy to store.
These advantages provided the justification for supporting
the cruise missile alternative.
Opposition to the cruise missile, however, was able to
counter those arguments and make a strong case against the
cruise missile alternative. First, a cruise missile can be
intercepted more readily than a ballistic missile; a larger
force of cruise missiles is therefore required to ensure
penetration of Soviet defences. "With the possibility of a
British cruise missile force in mind, it would be true to say
that Soviet defences erected against the expectation of a
massive American attack of some thousands of missiles could
effect a much higher rate of attrition against a smaller
9force." Furthermore, cruise missiles only have a single
warhead, which means a larger force is necessary to achieve
sufficient striking power. Third, cruise missiles are shorter
ranged than ballistic missiles, which gives the submarine less
searoom in which to operate. Fourth, the use of torpedo tubes
to fire the missiles would result in a slower rate of fire
and therefore greater vulnerability to ASW or counter-battery
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fire during the firing sequence. Finally, to achieve a
sufficient force level would require more submarines than a
ballistic missile force and submarines are the most expensive
component. Consideration was given to placing cruise missiles
on a nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) , but their
mission is completely incompatible with strategic nuclear
strike. As a result of these factors, the cruise missile
alternative was rejected.
D. TRIDENT
On July 15, 1980 the British Government announced its
intention to purchase the American TRIDENT missile as Britain's
future deterrent. The new arrangement, by which Britain would
buy the American weapon, was remarkably similar to the Nassau
Agreement eighteen years earlier. The United States would
provide the missiles, fire control equipment, and technical
assistance, while Britain would build the submarines and
nuclear warheads itself. The decision to buy TRIDENT, however,
came about only after consideration of several SLBM alter-
natives, arguments for TRIDENT, and questions on the size of
the program.
Before the decision to purchase TRIDENT was made, some
consideration was given to other SLBM alternatives. A solely
British missile, or an Anglo-French missile, was dismissed as
being too costly to develop, and lacking in the technological
sophistication of American weapons. Many advocated continuing
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with the POLARIS missile in new hulls, but the arguments of
age, obsolescence against an ABM defense, and lack of com-
monality with the U.S. Navy, defeated that alternative.
Consideration was given to the American POSEIDON missile,
but most of the arguments against POLARIS apply to it as well,
and the costs would be as high as TRIDENT. 11 Only TRIDENT
offered Britain an advanced system in which the Royal Navy
could share material and technical support with the U.S. Navy
into the the next century.
TRIDENT offers Britain several advantages as a nuclear
deterrent. First, it is a new, modern system, offering
greater reliability in service as well as commonality of
material with the American SSBN force. "Trident components
will be more reliable and have a longer life than those for
POLARIS, allowing missiles to remain in their tubes through-
out their planned 7-8 year period between major submarine
refits, with such periodic servicing as is necessary carried
12
out in the submarines themselves by British personnel."
Secondly, TRIDENT offers far greater striking power than the
alternatives, a very important point when present and future
Soviet ABM defenses are considered. Third, the greater range
of TRIDENT allows the submarine greater sea-room and therefore
greater survivability. These factors make TRIDENT the best
choice for Britain's future.
Initially Britain chose the TRIDENT I C-4 missile for its
future deterrent. Although the United States was developing
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the TRIDENT II D-5 missile, no decision on production was
expected until the mid-1980s. The Reagan Administration,
however, decided to accelerate the D-5 production schedule.
This offered Britain a choice between the C-4 and D-5 versions
and in March 1982 the British Government chose the TRIDENT II
D-5. Although this larger, more capable missile would cost
390 million pounds more (in September, 1980 prices) it would
be more economical over the lifetime of the system, as the
United States would phase out the C-4 by the late 1990s, and
commonality with the Americans would be lost if Britain
13
stayed with the C-4. Britain's future missile will be the
TRIDENT II D-5.
Although the decision over which missile to buy was para-
mount, some discussion has also centered around the design of
the missile-carrying submarine. Some consideration was given
to an inexpensive diesel-powered coastal submarine, but the
requirement to snorkel, lack of range, lack of commonality
with the Americans, vulnerability to mining and the costs in
manpower and money that a larger force would require, ruled
14
out the non-nuclear-powered option. Instead the new sub-
marines will be fitted with PWR- 2 type reactors, the newest
design in the Royal Navy. Questions also arose over the
number of missile tubes, with choice of twelve or sixteen
being the most popular. Although twelve-tube boats would
save 80 million pounds over the sixteen-tube option, it would
reduce striking power by one-fourth. Furthermore, sixteen
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tubes give added flexibility should Soviet ABM defenses
improve. The future Brtish TRIDENT submarine will be a
nuclear-powered boat with sixteen tubes capable of carrying
TRIDENT II D-5 missiles.
The final issue concerning TRIDENT has been that of the
number of boats to be built. The dilemma is the same as that
of the POLARIS program. "Four is the minimum needed to sus-
tain without fail at least one always on patrol." A fifth
boat would double the minimum number on patrol, and cost a
smaller percentage of the program than the first four boats,
but would still remain very expensive. The Thatcher Government
has therefore elected to order four new submarines, with an
option to order a fifth. Given Britain's economic constraints
and its success with the four-boat POLARIS force, however,
the eventual building of a fifth TRIDENT submarine remains
very unlikely. In structure the TRIDENT force will resemble
the POLARIS force it supercedes.
The Royal Navy has been charged with the responsibility
for Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent since 1969, and will
continue to hold that responsibility into the future. The
POLARIS force has provided Britain with a secure second-strike
capability which has served as a successful deterrent to
attack on Great Britain. The TRIDENT program will continue
to provide that capability for Britain into the next century.
Britain remains determined to be a nuclear power, and the
embodiment of the power will continue to be the Royal Navy's
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IV. THE ROYAL NAVY AND GREAT
BRITAIN'S EUROPEAN COMMITMENT
The second great arena of power which involves the Royal
Navy is that of Europe. The primary role of the Royal Navy's
conventional forces today is directly related to Britain's
commitment to NATO and collective security in Europe. With
the retreat from East of Suez, the Navy has evolved from
being a global navy to being a European navy. All British
naval procurement since the mid-1960' s, except for the POLARIS
force, has been to meet the requirements of a Europe-centered
naval role. That change has been accepted by most British
policy-makers, and today debates and discussions on the Royal
Navy's missions, tasks and future center on this role.
The Navy's role in European security is shaped by several
factors. As an island nation, Britain has a long and great
maritime tradition. The Royal Navy is faced with a con-
siderable maritime threat from the Soviet Northern and Baltic
Fleets. However, in contrast to these factors in favor of a
larger fleet, other factors serve to limit Britain's naval
efforts. Britain's economic decline has placed severe con-
straints on the resources available for the military. Within
these limits the Navy must compete with the Army and Air
Force presence in the Federal Republic of Germany. NATO's
basic concept of the major Soviet threat being a ground and
air threat in Central Eurooe has given the British Armv of
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the Rhine and RAF Germany a primacy of purpose which the
Navy has found difficult to match. This tendency is enhanced
by the British Government's political goals and commitments
toward its European allies, which include greater integration
into the West European system. As a result, the importance
of the Royal Navy's primary missions has come under doubt, and
perhaps worse, a sea-oriented strategy may have become poli-
tically incompatible with British foreign policy. Nevertheless,
the Royal Navy plays a major role in Britain's European defense
effort, and will continue to play such a role in the future.
A. THE ROYAL NAVY'S HISTORICAL ROLE TOWARD EUROPE
For over four centuries, the Royal Navy has been the great
shield protecting the British Isles from Europe's wars. It
has defended against invasion threats, protected British
commerce and communications, and has made Britain's will felt
by its continental foes. In accomplishing these tasks, the
Royal Navy has employed various concepts and aspects of naval
power.
The most important of the Navy's historical roles has been
that of sea-control around the British Isles. That those
islands have not undergone a foreign invasion for over 900
years testifies to the effectiveness with which that role has
been carried out. In 1588, a massive invasion fleet sent by
Phillip II of Spain was defeated and driven off in a great
running battle uo the English Channel and East Coast of
5^

England. In 1805 Napoleon marched the Grand Army to Calais
in preparation to invade England, but attempts to gain even
temporary control of the Channel failed, and ultimately led
to decisive defeat at Trafalgar. In 1940, Hitler was forced
to abandon Operation Seelowe (Sealion), the invasion of
England, when the Luftwaffe failed to achieve air control or
sea control over the Channel. Although this battle was fought
primarily by the RAF, it was the Royal Navy's superiority
over the German Navy that made German air control a must in
order to even attempt an invasion. In addition to these
three episodes, the Navy has acted as an effective deterrent
preventing foes from even considering invasion throughout
numerous wars and crises over the past four centuries. Con-
trol of the "Narrow Sea" has been the first and foremost of
the Royal Navy's missions.
A second great historical role of the Royal Navy has been
protection of the sea lines of communication. For an island
nation lacking in many national resources and with a large
overseas empire, maintaining those lines of communication is
vital. This dependence on overseas commerce has grov/n over
time, as Britain's population has out-stripped British agri-
culture's ability to feed it, and the pace of technology has
demanded ever more resources. This vulnerability has led
many of Britain's enemies to employ a strategy of guerre de
course, or war on commerce, against the British. The French
have employed it throughout their wars with Britain, the
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Americans employed it in the American Revolution and War of
1812, and Germany has twice in this century brought Britain
near defeat by submarine war against British seaborne
communications
.
In order to counter this strategy and protect those com-
munications, the British have adopted several methods to
ensure a satisfactory degree of sea control. One method has
been to limit the enemy's access to the open sea, through
blockade or control of straits. (The North Sea mine barrage
of 1918, whereby British laid a minefield across the North
Sea from Scotland to near Norway, is one example of this
technique.) A second method has involved sending "hunting"
forces out to track down and destroy enemy commerce raiders.
Ultimately, however, the most successful technique has been
to convoy shipping. Although convoying has occasionally been
dismissed at the beginning of some conflicts as obsolete, the
British have reverted to it whenever other methods alone have
failed. Britain's geographic situation has made protection
of sea communications almost as vital as defense against
invasion.
The third major naval role xvhich Britain has historically
performed in Europe has been that of power projection ashore.
This too has taken several forms. The most effective way in
which British seapower has been felt on the continent has
been through the instrument of blockade. Whether through
close blockade, as during the wars against France, or distant
55

blockade, as in the First World War, Britain has repeatedly
proved capable of bringing economic ruin upon European
opponents. It was the British blockade that brought defeat
to Holland in the Seventeenth Century. It was the British
blockade that wrecked Napoleon's Continental System, and
helped to bring about the disastrous invasion of Russia. And,
it was the British blockade that helped to provoke revolution
and collapse in Germany in the fall of 1918.
The other aspect of power projection has been the landing
of British troops on the continent. Wellington's campaigns
in Iberia and the Low Countries were made possible by seapower,
as was the Crimean Campaign and, of course, the invasions of
Sicily, Italy and France during the Second World War. Through
power projection, the Royal Navy has played a decisive role
in British policy toward Europe.
Since 1945 the Royal Navy's approach to these historic
roles has changed dramatically. As a result of Britain's
naval decline vis a vis the United States and the Soviet
Union and the development of nuclear weapons, both the rele-
vance of these roles and their practicality have been called
into question. However, despite some change in terminology
and technique, the present roles and missions of the Royal
Navy in Europe are a continuance of these historic roles.
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B. THE NAVAL THREAT
Today the Royal Navy faces a naval threat which, in
capability and power relative to the British fleet alone, is
by far the greatest in Britain's history. Since the late
1950s, when it surpassed the Royal Navy in overall strength,
the Soviet Navy has grown into the world's largest navy,
matching the shrunken Royal Navy many times over. In the air,
on the surface, and under the sea, the Soviets pose a severe
challenge for the British.
The Soviet Long-Range Naval Air Force poses a major threat
for British surface units north of Scotland. Operating from
bases on the Kola Peninsula, BACKFIRE, BLINDER, BADGER, and
BEAR bombers carrying AS-2, AS-3, AS-4, AS-5 and AS-6 air-to-
surface stand-off missiles constitute a threat which the Royal
Navy would find impossible to stop. These missiles would
likely prove difficult for shipboard weapons to intercept and
a fleet-carrier-less Royal Navy would be hard pressed to engage
the aircraft themselves. In addition to the land-based bombers,
the Soviet Navy* has begun to move into sea-based aviation as
well. The KIEV-class ships have given the Soviets a VSTOL
capability similar to that of the British INVINCIBLE class,
while the Soviets now have a full-deck aircraft carrier under
construction. Any British naval effort must take into con-
sideration the Soviet Union's considerable air strike capability
The Soviet surface fleet also composes a major threat to
the Royal Navy. This fleet has grown from a primarily coastal
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force in the 1950s into a large fully-capable ocean-going
fleet. The Soviets have achieved superiority over Britain
both in numbers and size of units. Large, powerful ships
such as the battlecruiser KIROV, the KIEV class carriers, and
KRASINA, KARA, and KRESTA cruisers have no match in the British
fleet. Furthermore, the Soviet major surface combatants out-
number British units by four-to-one. The Soviet surface
fleet possesses an extensive air defence, anti-submarine, and
anti-ship cruise missile capability. Although this Soviet
surface fleet is by no means invulnerable, it does pose a
major challenge to the Royal Navy and its allies.
Since the Second World War, the Soviet Union has main-
tained the world's largest submarine force. This force, many
times larger than the German U-boat fleet that nearly defeated
Britain in 1940, is equipped with nuclear-powered as well as
diesel-powered submarines, and many of these boats are armed
with ant i- shipping cruise missiles. The new ALFA-class
submarines have demonstrated underwater performance abilities
far greater than any other submarine in the world. Although
the Royal Navy is configured to a large degree for ASW
operations, its ability is far overmatched by the size of
the Soviet subsurface threat.
Although on paper the Soviet Navy far out-numbers the
Royal Navy, the Soviets have many ether commitments beyond
the North Atlantic, and their forces are discussed around the
world. Two Soviet fleets, the Pacific and the Black Sea, as
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well as the Mediterranean Squadron, pose only indirect threats
to Britain. The other two, the Baltic Fleet and the Northern
Fleet, however, do pose a direct threat. The Baltic Fleet is
the nearest threat to the British Isles, and one which the
Royal Navy would likely face without much support from the
United States Navy. However, the Baltic Fleet is the smallest
of the four Soviet fleets, and its equipment is rather old.
Furthermore, the narrow waters it would need to transit in
order to reach the North Sea and its close proximity to NATO
land-based air forces limit its ability to threaten Britain.
The Northern Fleet, however, is a different matter. The
largest and most modern of the four fleets, it can strike
directly against the British Isles and the North Atlantic sea
lanes from its bases on the Kola Peninsula. It is on this
threat axis that any future naval war for Britain will be
fought and decided.
C. THE ROYAL NAVY'S PRESENT ROLE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC
The principal role of the Royal Navy in a conventional
war in Central Europe would be to secure the sea-lines-of -
communication in the Eastern Atlantic and the English Channel.
This role involves not only the protection of maritime com-
munication itself, but of the British Isles as an eastern
terminus of trans-Atlantic communications. British naval
leaders accepted this role in the years following World War
Two, when memories of the Battle of the Atlantic were still




requirement provided the Royal Navy some insulation from the
3
full effects of the post-Empire cutbacks. However, increasing
financial pressure has combined today with the many doubts as
to the validity of such a role in either a short war or a
nuclear scenario to threaten even the continuance of that role
for the Navy. Yet the British Government remains committed,
though with reduced means, toward maintaining the principal
role of protecting sea communications.
The first aspect of performing this role involves pro-
tection of the United Kingdom base itself. The Navy's part
in this mission is centered around anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) and mine warfare in British waters, particularly around
ports, and in the Channel. For its local anti-submarine forces,
Britain will rely principally on maritime patrol aircraft and
its conventional submarines, although surface units and
nuclear submarines could be diverted to deal with a threat so
close to the homeland. The vulnerability of British ports to
offensive mining has caused some alarm, and Britain has
responded with the new HUNT-class mine-countermeasures (MCM)
vessels
.
Furthermore, STANAVFORCHAN, a combined force of MCM units
from several navies, but under British control, provides
additional forces in the English Channel. Although Britain's
naval effort in its own waters is not calculated to counter a
massive naval attack, it is designed to meet a subsurface/
mine threat which could develop in a conventional war.
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With reasonable security of British waters achieved, the
most important mission of the Royal Navy becomes that of
protection of the transatlantic sea lanes. Under present
NATO planning, massive quantities of troops and supplies
would be moved from North America to Europe, without which
NATO would be very hard-pressed to survive. Most of this
would come by ship. "The reinforcement and resupply of
forces in Europe is completely dependent on the sea lanes
across the Atlantic Ocean being kept open." Protection of
the sea lanes serves not only a wartime role but a peacetime
deterrent role as well. By emphasizing such a role, the
Royal Navy makes the reinforcement of American troops in
7
Europe more feasible. This role, of course, does not fall
on the Royal Navy alone, but is shared with the United States
Navy and the navies of the European allies. While the
Americans provide almost all the forces for the western and
central Atlantic, the Royal Navy provides at least 901 of
gNATO's available forces in the Eastern Atlantic. Fulfilling
this mission demands the preponderance of British conventional
forces
.
British perceptions of the nature of the threat to sea
communications have shaped the conventional forces of the
Royal Navy. The experiences of two world wars and the Soviets
'
limit ability to project air or surface power into the Central
Atlantic have made the perceived major threat to be subsurface.
"The orthodox view, particularly in Britain, has been that
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the main naval task will be to protect the seaborne rein-
forcement and resupply of the Central Front against Soviet
9
submarine attack." To meet this threat the Royal Navy has
become principally an ASW force. "ASW is the major pre-
occupation of the modern Royal Navy."
The ASW mission can be accomplished by performing three
tasks. These would involve attacking Soviet submarines as
they leave their bases, intercepting them as they run the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, and finding and
destroying those that enter the Central Atlantic. The first
task is the exclusive domain of the nuclear-powered attack
submarine, and although British submarines may participate,
their lack of numbers would leave that role largely to the
American submarines. The other two tasks, however, would
involve considerable British forces.
The battle of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap
would be of key importance in deciding the next war for the
Atlantic and the Royal Navy would play a major part in that
battle. "In these areas its role would be to prevent Soviet
maritime forces, whether air, surface, or sub-surface, from
1?
entering the re-supply convoy routes." ** To accomplish this,
the Navy has placed the heaviest emphasis on submarines and
maritime patrol aircraft.
This results from several factors. First, submarines are
considered by many to be the best ASW platform, as they operate
in the same medium as their prey. Furthermore, the nature of
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the barrier is such that submarines can operate well below
cavitation speed (and therefore much more quietly) and still
intercept submarines passing through the area. Secondly,
most of the GIUK Gap is well within range of the RAF maritime
patrol aircraft and strike aircraft, should a surface threat
appear. Finally, surface ships have been given a less
important role as a result of continuing doubts about their
survivability against cruise missiles and aircraft. These
doubts were further fueled by the Falklands War. "Indeed in
one respect the fundamental premise that surface ships were
becoming distressingly vulnerable was supported all too
dramatically by the evidence provided by Exocet and some very
unsophisticated free-fall bombs, many of which failed to
detonate." As a result submarines and ASW aircraft are
14
considered the best weapons for fighting the GIUK Gap battle.
This attitude has been reflected in all British Defence
Estimates since The Way Forward in 1981. While force levels
for surface ships have been reduced, the nuclear-powered
attack submarine program has continued, and some increases
have been made in maritime patrol aircraft force levels. A
substantial portion of these forces will be committed to the
vital GIUK Gap barrier. Although British forces by themselves
would be ineffective in covering this area, together with
American forces, such an effort could greatly reduce the





Even a massive barrier effort is not guaranteed to stop
all Soviet submarine penetration, nor does it deal with sub-
marines already in the Central Atlantic at the beginning of
hostilities. How to deal with this problem is still an issue
for debate. Computer analysis supports the concept of pro-
tected sea lanes patrolled by hunting groups. The
INVINCIBLE-class aircraft carriers would conceivably form the
nucleus of such a group. However, historical precedent indi-
cates that the convoy is more effective, and prudence indicates
that the Western navies must be prepared for either task.
Fortunately, the force requirement for both tasks are similar.
In any action in the mid-Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft
would be severely limited by short on-station times. Sub-
marines would be limited as well, in that the speeds required
to keep up with surface ships, such as a convoy, would require
sacrificing the advantage of silence because of cavitation.
Furthermore, submarines cannot operate aircraft effectively.
Therefore, it is the ASW-conf igured surface ship which pro-
vides the best tool for protecting ocean shipping, either in
17
convoy or along a sea lane. The Royal Navy's frigates,
destroyers, and aircraft carriers are designed to meet this
requirement. As pioneers in ASW helicopter operations, the
British have placed helicopters on virtually all their surface
ships. Working in conjunction with ship-mounted sonars and
weapons, particularly American ships equipped with powerful
passive sonars, the ASW helicopters would become the primary
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defensive shield of a convoy, or the offensive weapon of a
hunting group. In addition, the surface ships' air-defense
missile batteries and guns would provide the convoys with
some protection against submarine-launched cruise missiles.
This task, like most tasks undertaken by the Royal Navy, will
be shared with the United States Navy and the navies of
Western Europe. However, the Royal Navy would provide the
major surface effort in the Eastern Atlantic in any future
Battle of the Atlantic.
In addition to these major tasks for the Royal Navy in
wartime, there are other tasks which also require some
attention as well. Should the United States Navy send a
carrier strike force north of the GIUK Gap against Soviet
bases on the Kola Peninsula, the Royal Navy would send an
1
8
ASW group built around an aircraft carrier. This possi-
bility would depend upon the availability of ships, both
American and British, and how the situation might develop.
Another task would involve sending British troops, particularly
the Royal Marines, to Norway as reinforcements. However, with
the draw-down of British amphibious forces (a process slowed
but not stopped by the Falklands War) the Royal Marines could
only be sent to southern Norway by normal transport and then
sent via railroad to the north. Although these tasks are
possible due to the flexibility of seapower, the diminished
size of the Royal Navy makes them rather impractical (except
for sending the Marines to Norway by non-amphibious means)
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to accomplish with the priority demands of the battle to
protect sea-lines -of -communication.
D. ALTERNATIVE ROLES FOR THE ROYAL NAVY
The roles and tasks which the Royal Navy has taken on
for itself do not solve all of Britain's maritime security
problems in a European conflict. Although many alternative
roles are well beyond British capabilities and resources to
perform, these are alternatives which could significantly
enhance Britain's military situation.
The present strategy has several weaknesses which could
result in a failure of Britain's naval and military effort,
even excluding the uncertainities of nuclear war. First,
for the sea-lines-of -communication to be of value, NATO
ground forces must contain a Soviet thrust in Central Europe
and prolong the conflict. Furthermore, sufficient pre-war
warning must be given for the United States to assemble the
19
reinforcements and material to be shipped. Even more
crucial, the present planning has little to offer Britain
should the Central Front collapse without use of nuclear
weapons or the Soviets attack in the north rather than in
Central Europe. In either case the Royal Navy would be of
20
critical value. Should one of these situations develop,
the Navy must be prepared to meet the challenge.
Should the Central Front collapse without either side




a potential invasion threat. Although the elimination of
the British Isles could be easily accomplished by using
nuclear weapons, the potential costs of such an attack,
including British nuclear retaliation against the Soviet
Union, could make that option unacceptable to the Soviets.
As a result, Britain could be in a situation similar to that
in 1940. The Soviets could then seek to neutralize the
British Isles by either mass conventional bombing and a close
naval blockade (similar to the American operations against
Japan in the summer of 1945) , or they could attempt an
amphibious landing, similar to the planned German Operation
SEALION in 1940. For Britain to withstand the threat and
survive, it would require not only air defenses capable of
neutralizing Soviet air attacks, but naval forces able to
counter Soviet naval moves around Britain as well.
The Royal Navy's task in such a dilemma would be to deny
the Soviet Union the use of waters around the British Isles
for amphibious operations and to maintain communications
westward. Although the Navy presently is suited primarily
for ASW operations, much of the threat in this scenario would
be surface warships and amphibious forces. Therefore, the
Royal Navy would require more anti-air warfare (AAW) and
anti-surface vessel warfare (ASVW) capability. The ASVW
mission would be shared with RAF Strike Command, but after
combat losses on the Central Front and with the air battle
over Britain raging, the RAF may have little to divert to
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that mission. As a result the Navy must be prepared to fight
the battle alone. Although the British could ultimately be
overwhelmed by the Soviets, they could significantly raise
the costs to the Soviets and thus perhaps deter a major sea-
borne attack. Although this concept echoes Admiral Tirpitz's
* 22failed "Riskflotte" theory first espoused in 1900, " the
enormous destructive potential of even light forces, the
geography of the situation, the American naval threat to the
Soviets, and the different goals for a British "risk fleet"
(invasion deterrence, not war deterrence) could make such a
strategy successful under these special conditions. Either
way Britain's chance of survival is enhanced should the
Central Front collapse.
To improve the Royal Navy's anti-surface capability, some
changes would be required in the Navy's force structure. One
reasonably economical measure would be to place anti-ship
cruise missiles, such as the French EXOCET or American
HARPOON, on all frigates and destroyers. Another measure
would be the deployment of missile-armed light craft. Since
the Soviets must approach the British Isles, numerous in-
expensive coastal craft such as hydrofoils or surface-effect
vessels (hovercraft) armed with cruise missiles could wreak
This theory held that any British effort to destroy the
German fleet would result in such severe loss for the British,
that they would lose naval supremacy over other rivals and




havoc on an approaching invasion force. Thirdly, a large
force of short-range diesel submarines would be effective not
only in countering an invasion threat, but would improve the
ASW capability in British waters required by the present
strategy. Finally, a larger mine warfare force, capable of
extensive defensive mining operations could further inhibit
Soviet naval operations around the British Isles. None of
these steps would be overly expensive, and Britain's ability
to withstand an invasion would be greatly enhanced.
Another major security problem which the Royal Navy is
presently ill-equipped to counter is the possibility of a
Soviet move in an area other than Central Europe. One
possibility would be a Soviet move against Greece or Turkey,
which would by Treaty obligate Britain to go to war with the
Soviet Union. However, the Royal Navy no longer maintains
a significant presence in the Mediterranean, and the major
Allied naval effort in that sea would be undertaken by the
U.S. and Mediterranean states. The other Soviet alternative
would be a move in the North against Norway. "Indeed, if
the Soviet Union actually intend (sic) to start a conventional
war, Norway would arguably be the best place for them to do
23it." Allied strength in that area is very low, and the
Soviets might speculate that an attack combined with political
pressure on the NATO nations in Central Europe could cause
those nations to break their Treaty obligations, thus ending
the NATO alliance. The Soviets could even choose a policy
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of political coercion which could give them substantial pay-
24
offs without war." Whatever the case, a Soviet move against
Norway could turn NATO's flank and pose a direct threat
against Britain.
Whichever way the Soviets move against Norway, the
British response would be principally naval. A Soviet attack
would almost certainly involve airborne assaults against
Norwegian airfields while amphibious forces seize ports such
as Narvik. In such an area, Soviet airpower based on the
Kola peninsula could effectively prevent British surface
vessels from moving into the area. Unless the Royal Navy
receives air cover from American aircraft carriers, the only
effective weapon against the amphibious forces would be sub-
marines. A mixture of nuclear and diesel submarines armed
with cruise missiles as well as torpedoes could do considerable
damage to Soviet amphibious forces around Norway. Although
later consideration could be given to making an amphibious
assault with the Royal Marines (with or without the United
States Marines) , such an operation would first require
neutralization of the Soviet air threat and establishment of
sea-control in Norwegian waters by surface as well as sub-
surface units. Whatever reaction the British make to an
attack, the Royal Navy will be their chief instrument.
Although Soviet naval and air superiority would limit
the operational options of the Royal Navy, an attempt by the
Soviets to threaten and coerce Norway with a show of force
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would offer a wide range of reactions to the British. The
arrival of a British task force off Norway and near a Soviet
task force could act as an effective deterrent to a Soviet
attack and stiffen the will of the Norwegian Government to
withstand such overt pressure. For such a role, surface
units, because of their visibility, would be the most
25
effective show of force. Although the Soviet Naval Air
Force would still be a threat, cruise missile-armed surface
ships would pose a threat to Soviet naval units that their
aircraft would find difficult to pre-empt. The NATO Alliance
could even choose to place a permanent deterrent in Northern
waters by establishing another standing naval force, desig-
nated specifically for the Northern flank, and built around a
British INVINCIBLE-class carrier, with Norwegian, German,
26Dutch, Belgian, and American ships participating. A strong
force of surface combatants, armed with anti-ship cruise
missiles, as well as some anti-air capability, would offer
Britain several choices in effectively dealing with a serious
Soviet threat to a vulnerable but vital flank of both Britain
and NATO.
E. THE NAVY'S FORCE STRUCTURE 27
Despite recent cutbacks, Britain still possesses the
largest and most capable European Navy in NATO. Its fleet
is equipped with modern, sophisticated ships, weapons and
technology. In order to fulfill its present roles and
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missions, the Royal Navy maintains surface, subsurface, air,
amphibious, and mine warfare capabilities.
Britain's large surface fleet possesses an all-around
capability, including the operation of aircraft. The
largest surface combatant in the fleet is the aircraft
carrier HERMES, commissioned in 1959. This 28,700 ton (all
tonnages full load) sole survivor of Britain's once great
carrier fleet no longer operates normal fixed-wing aircraft,
but carries five SEA HARRIER VSTOL jets and twelve SEA KING
ASW helicopters. For self-defense, HERMES has two SEA CAT
short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers. This
ship will remain in service until completion of ARK ROYAL in
1985. The other major air-capable units are the INVINCIBLE-
class light aircraft carriers of which two, INVINCIBLE and
ILLUSTRIOUS, are in service and a third, ARK ROYAL, is under
construction. These 19,500-ton ships each carry five SEA
HARRIER jets and mine SEA KING helicopters and are armed with
SEA DART SAM missiles. All these ships are capable of
operating more aircraft if necessary, such as in the Falklands
War when HERMES and INVINCIBLE operated twenty SEA HARRIERs
each. Britain continues to maintain an aircraft carrier
force
.
The main body of the British surface fleet consists of
destroyers and frigates. The destroyers are in three classes,
the "County" class, the Type 82, and the Type 42. The older
"County" class displace 6,200 tons and are armed with four
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EXOCET cruise missiles, SEA SLUG and SEA CAT SAMs , and two
4.5 inch guns. Only three of the original eight ships in
this class remain in service. The Type 82 class consists of
only one ship, BRISTOL, which displaces 7,100 tons and is
armed with SEA DART, a 4.5 inch gun, and the IKARA ASW rocket.
The Type 42 class, which has nine ships in service and three
under construction (two other ships, SHEFFIELD and COVENTRY,
were sunk in the Falklands War) , are armed with SEA DART and
a 4.5 inch gun and displace 4,100 tons. All British destroyers
except BRISTOL carry ASW helicopters.
The frigates likewise can be broken down in several
classes. The oldest frigate in the fleet is the TORQUAY, the
only surviving WHITBY-class unit in service. It displaces
2,560 tons, is armed with two 4.5 inch guns and a LIMBO ASW
mortar, and is used as a training and testing ship. There
also remains in service three "Tribal" class ships of 2,700
tons and armed with SEA CAT, two 4.5 inch guns, and LIMBO.
Eight of the original nine ROTHESAY-class frigates remain in
service (though one now serves as a trials ship) . These ships
displace 2,800 tons and are armed with SEACAT, two 4.5 inch
guns, LIMBO, and carry an ASW helicopter. The largest class
in service is the LEANDER-class with twenty-four ships still
in service (two others transferred to New Zealand) . The
armament varies in this class, with nine units having two
4.5 inch guns, SEACAT and LIMBO, eight units having EXOCET,
SEACAT, and torpedo tubes, and the other seven having IKARA,
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LIMBO, and SEACAT. All units carry an ASW helicopter. The
Type-21 frigates displace 3,250 tons and are armed with EXOCET,
SEACAT, a 4.5 inch gun, and carry an ASW helicopter. Six
ships of the class are in service (two others, ARDENT and
ANTELOPE were sunk off the Falklands) . The newest class of
frigates in service are the Type 22, of which five are in
service and eight more are under construction or are on order.
These ships are armed with the SEA WOLF SAM, which has proven
effective against even cruise missiles, EXOCET, torpedo tubes,
and an ASW helicopter. A newer class, the Type 23, is still
in the planning stages, with no ships on order. Although the
present British force structure includes thirteen destroyers
and forty-seven frigates, that force is currently scheduled
to be reduced to fifty units during the 1980s. These ships,
however, will continue to carry out the tasks which require
surface ships.
Britain maintains a substantial submarine force which is
becoming the principal arm of the Royal Navy. The backbone
of this force is the nuclear-power attack submarine (SSN) , of
which Britain has eleven, six of SWIFTSURE-class and five of
the VALIANT-class . In addition, five new vessels of the
TRAFALGAR-class are under construction or on order. All
these SSN's are armed with torpedoes, and plans are being
considered to buy the American HARPOON anti-ship cruise
missile, which can be fired from torpedo tubes while submerged,
Britain also operates thirteen OBERON-class diesel-electric
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submarines armed with torpedoes. Two older PORPOISE-ciass
submarines are also still in service but are being phased out.
A new class of conventional -powered submarines is currently
under design as well. Britain's mixture of nuclear-powered
and conventional -powered attack submarines gives the Royal
Navy the capability to carry out submarine missions and tasks
both in British waters and over the entire North Atlantic
area.
Although land-based maritime patrol aircraft are under
RAF control, all sea-based aviation is part of the Fleet Air
Arm (FAA) . The FAA currently operates the SEA HARRIER VSTOL
strike aircraft which proved successful in the Falklands War.
This very maneuverable plane is capable of 640 knots speed
and is capable of carrying guns, bombs, rockets, and SIDE-
WINDER air-to-air missiles. The Navy currently has around
thirty SEA HARRIERs in service, and more on order. In
addition to the strike aircraft, the FAA also has over a
hundred ASW helicopters of the SEA KING, LYNX, WASP, and
WESSEX types. The SEA KING, operated off the carriers can
carry a dipping sonar, torpedoes, depth charges or a radar.
The LYNX, operated off the newer-type destroyers and frigates,
can carry torpedoes or depth charges. The WASP, operated off
the older frigates, and the WESSEX, on the "County" class
destroyers, are also capable of carrying ASW torpedoes. It
is these aircraft and helicopters, which provide the seaborne




The Royal Navy today continues to maintain an amphibious
capability. This force was scheduled to be drawn down, but
its successful performance in the Falklands War has won it a
reprieve. The major units of this force are two 12,120 ton
amphibious assault ships, FEARLESS and INTREPID, capable of
carrying 400 to 700 troops (depending on distance to be
carried) plus tanks and helicopters. Backing these two ships
up are five 5,674 ton logistics landing ships of the SIR
LANCELOT class which can carry tanks and other combat vehicles
A sixth ship of this class, the SIR GALAHAD, was sunk in the
Falklands War. Finally, each of Britain's aircraft carriers
is capable of carrying a helicopter commando force, if
necessary. Amphibious forces still remain a part of the
Royal Navy.
The arm of the Royal Navy which would utilize that
capability is the 7,900 man Royal Marines. The principal
organization unit of this force is the Commando, a battalion
size formation. As the name Commando implies, the Royal
Marines specialize in commando-style operations using both
landing craft and helicopters. The Royal Marines, combined
with Britain's amphibious assault ships, give the Navy the
capability to project power ashore.
Because of Britain's geography and the nature of the
threat, the Royal Navy maintains a substantial mine-sweeping
capability. The newest MCM vessels are the HUNT-class with
six in service and five more under construction. In addition,
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Britain has twenty-eight "Ton" class, one WILTON class, and
two VENTURER class sweepers and hunters in service. These
vessels are mostly small craft with only a coastal mine-
sweeping capability. The Royal Navy currently operates no
mine layers, but its mine sweepers give Britain some defense
against on offensive mining campaign.
F. THE ROYAL NAVT AND ITS ALLIES
Any future European war would involve not only Britain,
but its European and North American allies as well.
Accordingly, any understanding of the Royal Navy's wartime
role requires an understanding of the degree that it cooper-
ates with the allied navies.
The most important of the allied fleets for Britain is
the United States Navy. Its Atlantic Fleet has a complete
range of capabilities, including fleet aircraft carriers,
numerous cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and nuclear-powered
attack submarines, and a large amphibious force. Any Royal
Navy effort beyond British waters would require the cooper-
ation and assistance of that fleet to be successful. The
battle of the GIUK Gap and of the trans-Atlantic sea lanes
would require substantial numbers of American submarines and
surface vessels. Any attempt to project sea control off
Northern Norway would require American carrier air cover.
The Royal Navy has become dependent on the United States Navy
to carry out its mission.
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The spirit of cooperation, however, between the two navies
is a strong one. The experience of cooperation in two world
wars, along with the NATO Alliance and shared threat per-
ceptions, has allowed that spirit to flourish. The two navies
today engage in numerous joint exercises. Tactical skills
and training procedures are shared between the navies. Surface
units of both fleets routinely operate together as members of
STANAVFORLANT. In wartime, the Royal Navy would provide both
the commander and the forces for Ant i- Submarine Group Two,
which would be the major ASW component of NATO Strike Fleet
Atlantic, a carrier strike force almost exclusively American
28in composition. Though the Royal Navy is to a degree
dependent on the United States Navy to carry out its missions,
the degree of cooperation between the two navies makes
American naval support in a European war a near certainty.
The Royal Navy cooperates with the European navies as well,
particularly those of West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and
Norway. British naval forces regularly exercise with ships
29from these nations and occasionally French units as well.
Britain contributes a destroyer or frigate to STANAVFORLANT,
where it operates with similar ships from the other NATO
navies. The Royal Navy also provides leadership as well as
ships to STANAVFORCHAN, a NATO MCM force which operates in
the English Channel and the southern part of the North Sea.
This force also draws units from the West German, Belgian,
and Dutch navies. Britain and the Netherlands also cooperate
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on amphibious operations. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps
has earmarked certain units to become part of the British
Commando Forces Royal Marines, which would provide support
for Norway should a Soviet northern offensive become apparent.
The Royal Navy is an alliance navy, and cooperation with
other navies in that alliance is a feature of Royal Navy
operations in the North Atlantic area.
The Royal Navy today is confronted with a great dilemma.
It is confronted with the greatest naval threat in its history
and yet its ability to counter that threat has never been
more limited. Britain cannot meet every threat, so it must
choose which threats it will counter and tailor its Navy
accordingly. Its choices will determine the Navy's future.
Presently, Britain has chosen the submarine threat to
trans-Atlantic sea lines of communication as the threat it
will counter, and the emphasis on submarines and land-based
air reflect that choice. However, other threats exist that
are either more grave, such as invasion if the Central Front
collapses, or more likely, such as an attack on Norway. To
meet these threats within the framework of limited defense
resources will require a fundamental re-assessment of
Britain's role in NATO, particularly the ground forces
commitment in Germany. Whether the British Government is
willing to pay the potential political costs that such a
reappraisal would bring remains to be seen. However, should
war actually occur, the very survival of Britain as an
independent, free nation may depend on such a move.
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The British have historically dealt with their European
security problems principally through naval power. A major
ground forces commitment on the European Continent is so
historically unprecedented as to appear "unnatural" for
Britain. The Navy's present role in Europe is centered
around supporting such a commitment. Any change in the role
will depend on a return to Britain's maritime traditions. If
such a shift can be accomplished within NATO, the security of
both Britain and the Alliance could be significantly enhanced
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V. THE ROYAL NAVY BEYOND EUROPE
The third major arena of power which involves the Royal
Navy is the global arena. The Royal Navy today continues to
fulfill its historic role as protector of British interests
beyond Europe. As Britain's once great empire has been
dismantled and former colonies and dependencies have received
their independence, British security interests have decreased
around the globe. Simultanously , Britain's once global navy
has been reduced to being a largely European navy with little
presence beyond north Atlantic waters. However, some interests
do remain - legacies of Empire, treaty commitments, and
economic resources important to Britain and its allies. It
is these interests that demand occasional and sometimes sub-
stantial involvement by the Royal Navy beyond its primary
theater of operation. The Royal Navy continues to have a
small but significant role beyond Europe.
A. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE BEYOND EUROPE
Traditionally, the primary function of the Royal Navy
beyond Europe has been the defense of the British Empire.
For centuries Britain's many far-flung possessions and the
sea commerce between those possessions and Britain required
protection. Squadrons of cruisers, gunboats, and in certain
circumstances battleships patrolled the seas throughout the
reaches of the Empire. In fact, many of Britain's colonial

outposts were nothing more than refueling stations and supply
depots for the Navy. The Royal Navy was the power on which
the British Empire rested.
The Navy served not only a defensive purpose, but a more
active one as well. It permitted Britain to intervene in
almost any crisis it chose, and to make its will felt around
the world. "It was the prestige of the Royal Navy which
enabled Britain to succeed on the grand scale, by exercising
an authority on the shores of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans,
and on the Mediterranean Sea, out of all proportion to its
resources and population." The presence of British warships
was a very real and significant factor in international
diplomacy around the world. The Royal Navy was the standard
bearer as well as defender of Britain and British interests.
B. END OF THE GLOBAL NAVY
Since the end of the Second World War, the Royal Navy's
global role has changed dramatically. The end of Empire and
drastic financial retrenchment of the British defense
establishment have served to fundamentally alter both the
missions and capability of the Navy beyond Europe.
The first decade after the war saw the Royal Navy
carrying on much as it had before the war. Britain still
had the second largest navy in the world, including a large
aircraft carrier force. Though India was now independent,
the remainder of Britain's empire in Africa and Asia needed
protection, and British warships dominated the Indian Ocean.
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Yet, without India, the remainder of the Empire had lost its
raison d'etre. In fact, "...the maintenance of Britain's
role east of Suez was more important for the Royal Navy than
was the role of the Royal Navy for the maintenance of Britain's
9
position east of Suez."" However, the Suez fiasco of 1956
ended the complacency of Empire. As the pace of decolonization
rapidly accelerated, the role of the Navy changed.
The decade following Suez marked the last great era of
the Royal Navy as a global fleet. Initially following Suez,
the mood among British leaders was to cut back on conventional
forces, and the carriers, on which Britain's global role was
based, were prime targets. However, navy supporters resisted
the cuts and by 1961 the mood had changed. As various
colonies received independence and imperial outposts were
abandoned, the Navy's carriers were seen as substitutes and
mobile forces built around the carriers would be the main-
4
tainers of British presence in the Indian Ocean. Inter-
vention in Kuwait in 1961 to deter an Iraqi attack was
successful and increased British confidence. Labour took
office in 1964 determined to maintain the British presence
east of Suez. Britain's carrier fleet was aging, so a new
class of fleet carriers was planned. However, economic
realities soon shattered British strategy east of Suez. The
financial crisis of 1966 resulted in major military cutbacks,
including cancellation of the new aircraft carriers. The
fate of Britain's carrier fleet was sealed. Two years later
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came the stunning announcement of the end of British presence
east of Suez. By 1971 almost all British forces would be gone
from the Indian Ocean. The Royal Navy was no longer a global
fleet.
C. THE NAVY'S ROLE BEYOND EUROPE SINCE 1971
Since the end of Britain's major presence east of Suez
in 1971, Britain has maintained only token forces beyond
Europe. These have consisted mainly of a few scattered units
protecting remaining imperial commitments, or an occasional
showing of the flag, but reflect no major naval effort.
"Britain's remaining overseas dependencies in the Caribbean,
South Atlantic, and Indian Ocean lie outside NATO boundaries,
and their protection has been left by the planners to such
4
ad hoc support as can be cobbled together from time to time."
During the last decade, Britain has maintained a frigate at
Gibraltar as guardship, an occasional frigate at Belize to
deter Guatemala, and a few MCM vessels at Hong Kong.
Occasional around- the-world cruises were made by small groups
of ships, and Britain has participated in the Beira Patrol
in the Mozambique Channel and sent units to Oman when war
broke out between Iran and Iraq. Even these small distractions
have been a burden on an already overstretched fleet at home.
"Many years, however, must elapse before Britain attains a
comfortably insular outlook and finally pays off the death
duties of her imperial past." These few commitments will
remain into the future.
86

D. THE FALKLANDS WAR
On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands,
a British colony, and initiated a war for which the Royal
Navy had not prepared. Despite the tremendous decline in the
Royal Navy's power projection capability since 1971, Prime
Minister Thatcher was determined to fight. What resulted was
a war fought through brilliant improvisation in which the
Royal Navy demonstrated a capability which it had abandoned.
Britain promptly responded by assembling a fleet to send
to the South Atlantic. The core of that force was the old
carrier HERMES, due for disposal in a few years, and the light
carrier INVINCIBLE, which was to be sold to Australia. Along
with these ships would ultimately go eight destroyers, fifteen
frigates, both of Britain's amphibious assault ships, and
numerous supporting units. A large number of merchant ships
were also mobilized to carry supplies, equipment, or, as in
the case of the ocean liners QUEEN ELIZABETH II and CANBERRA,
troops. Even while this force was being assembled, British
submarines were converging on the Falklands to establish an
exclusion zone around the islands. By 5 April, the fleet
sailed for the South Atlantic, taking with it most of
Britain's naval strength. "The Task Force took some 70% of
the British naval and maritime air contribution to NATO, which
left gaps in the defense of the Western Approaches, the
significance of which has yet to be assessed." But for the




The long voyage south permitted the troops and sailors
to train and prepare for the coming battle, while diplomatic
channels were being exhausted. To support the move, the
British showed incredible ingenuity in establishing a
logistics chain. "It was by any standards a brilliant
campaign, marked by exceptional logistic planning and im-
provisation, and carried through with outstanding skill and
7fortitude." The entire movement south was conducted without
loss, and the logistics train was maintained 8,000 miles from
Britain.
By the time the fleet reached the area, diplomatic efforts
had failed, and the British seized the initiative. On 25
April, Royal Marines landed on South Georgia Island, 700 miles
east of the Falklands, and captured the Argentina forces there
Four days later, the fleet arrived off the Falklands and on
1 May, the British began air attacks on the Port Stanley air-
field. The next day, Britain scored a naval success when the
submarine CONQUEROR torpedoed and sank the Argentine cruiser
GENERAL BELGRANO. After that, the Argentine Navy never again
attempted to interfere with the Royal Navy's operations. By
seizing the initiative, the British Navy now controlled the
waters around the Falkland Islands.
Soon however, the Argentine Air Force struck back, and
the Royal Navy found itself fighting its first major battle
since 1945. On 4 May, an EXOCET missile launched from an
Argentine SUPER ETENDARD struck the destroyer SHEFFIELD,
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mortally damaging it. For the remainder of the month and
into June, the British fleet underwent a series of massive
air attacks from Argentine MIRAGE and SKYHAWK jets. The
aircraft were met by the British HARRIER VSTOL attack planes
armed with SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles, and by the fleet's
air defense missiles and guns. Over seventy Argentine air-
craft were downed by the British defenders during the conflict,
but British losses were also heavy. On 21 May the frigate
ARDENT was overwhelmed and sunk by bombs. Three days later,
its sister ship ANTELOPE sank when a bomb detonated in its
engine room. On 25 May Argentine bombing attacks overwhelmed
and sank the destroyer COVENTRY. The same day two air-launched
EXOCET missiles hit the containership ATLANTIC CONVEYOR,
sending it to the bottom. Though the major British landings
had been on 21 May, the Argentine effort against British
amphibious forces climaxed on 8 June, when Argentine jets
managed to sink the landing ship SIR GALAHAD and cripple the
SIR TRISTAM. Throughout the campaign other ships had also
taken less severe damage and five HARRIERS had been shot down.
On 14 June the Argentine garrison on the Falklands formally
surrendered to the British invasion force. Britain had won a
startling, but expensive victory.
Not surprisingly, the Falklands War brought out several
lessons about the Royal Navy, illustrating both strengths and
weaknesses. On the positive side, the degree of professionalism
and skill of the British sailors was outstanding. Furthermore,
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the Navy had shown an incredible degree of flexibility in
carrying out the campaign. Some aspects of the Navy's force
structure were also vindicated, including the INVINCIBLE class
light carrier, the amphibious forces, the nuclear-powered
attack submarine, and the HARRIER jumpjet.
On the negative side several weaknesses were shown in the
force structure. First, the focus on Europe resulted in no
warships being in the South Atlantic at the time of invasion
to either interfere or deter. "A British naval presence would
probably have prevented the attempt and saved many lives on
gboth sides." Second, the emphasis on ASW had allowed other
capabilities to atrophy. "The British were sharply reminded
of the desirability of having armed forces with a variety of
9
capabilities not necessarily tailored to one threat."" Two
problems in particular cost the British dearly. The lack of
any airborne early warning (AEW) capability allowed the
Argentine aircraft to achieve a degree of surprise, and the
lack of an effective anti-ship-missile-defense (ASMD) capa-
bility on most ships resulted in the loss of the SHEFFIELD.
However, the great lesson of the war was that the Royal Navy
can still project global power. "Britain has proved itself
once again, to be one of three, or possibly four countries
capable of mounting and sustaining a conflict 8000 miles from
its home base."
The Falklands War had had several repercussions on the
postwar Royal Navy. Several ships marked for disposal have
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been saved. The sale of INVINCIBLE to Australia has been
cancelled, as has the paying off of the destroyers GLAMORGAN,
FIFE, and BRISTOL, and the amphibious assault ships FEARLESS
and INTREPID. Four new Type 22 frigates have been orderd to
replace the destroyers and frigates sunk in the South Atlantic
As for the deficiencies in AEW and ASMD, a few WESSEX heli-
copters are now being converted to an AEW role, and the
American VULCAN PHALANX close-in weapon system is being fitted
to all major combatants. Finally, now at least one frigate
is being kept on station in the South Atlantic to deter a
repeat of 1982. The Falklands War has reinvigorated the
Royal Navy and has preserved for a time Britain's role beyond
Europe
.
The Royal Navy's global role still survives, despite the
dismantling of the British Empire and severe financial con-
straints. Though Britain's naval presence beyond Europe is
small, it does demand certain important resources. "One
distant ship, after all needs two more to back it up, to say
nothing of the demands of logistics support." Many British
have begun to question even these small entanglements, but
the prospects for final termination of the remaining naval
involvements beyond Europe have been dimmed by the Falklands
War. The Royal Navy will continue to operate some forces
around the globe in the immediate future.
However, Britain will never again attempt to maintain a
significant peacetime naval presence beyond Europe. In the
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case of war with the Soviet Union, the global activities of
the Royal Navy will have even less importance. "Naval defence,
no less than charity, begins at home and, if there is to be
12general war, is likely to end there - for the Royal Navy."
But should a limited war develop beyond Europe that directly
threatens British interests, a replay of 1982 is possible.
Though Great Britain's role as a global naval power may be
history, the Falklands War at least proved the Royal Navy can
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VI. THE ROYAL NAVY IN AN ERA
OF CONSTRAINED RESOURCES
Any consideration of the Royal Navy's future role in
British defense policy must be viewed in terms of the economic
and political constraints under which British policymakers
must operate. These constraints are the result of Britain's
relative decline as a leading power in the international
system during this century, especially since the Second World
War, and the political evolution of British society. Their
impact has been to cause tremendous competition for defense
resources among Britain's three armed services and within the
Navy itself. As the 1981 Defense White Paper The Way Forward
expressed the dilemma for the Navy, "...we have to think hard
about how we can most cost effectively shape our contribution
for the future, with account taken both of resource con-
straints and of technological change."
How British decisionmakers distribute these resources and
shape that contribution is determined by a number of con-
siderations: strategic and tactical, political and diplomatic,
economic, technological, and institutional. Habit and
tradition, and the British penchant for "muddling through"
also affect defense decisionmaking. These factors, working
in various combinations, have shaped the modern British
defense establishment and the Navy's role in that establishment,
including its size, equipment, deployment, and missions, and
94

the distribution of those resources and missions among its
various components.
A. CONSTRAINTS
All British defense policy today is made under certain
constraints which have shaped that policy to various degrees
over long periods of time. The dimensions and impact of these
constraints have grown or diminished as Britain's economic
and political fortunes and its international position have
changed.
By far the greatest constraint on Britain's armed forces
is the economic stringency which has come to characterize
British political life. As former Prime Minister Edward Heath
has observed, "We tend to give less attention to the basic
strategy which our forces should be adopting than to the
particular problems which arise out of the financial circum-
stances."" This dilemma is by no means a new development.
"The history of British defence policy is of an attempt to
3
reconcile the mismatch between resources and commitments."
This mismatch is the result of the great relative economic
decline Britain has experienced in this century. "Throughout
the twentieth century, British defense policy has been
4pursued in a context of relative economic decline."
This decline has been attributed to a multitude of factors
First, Britain has been dependent on imports since the early
days of the industrial revolution. This resulted from the
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population boom in Britain at the time, which outstripped
British agriculture's ability to feed that population. Also,
the British Isles were largely bereft of any natural resources
other than coal, which industrialization required. The
British Empire did provide much of the required imports, but
as the colonies developed their own political and economic
identities, the capital spent on imports was largely lost to
the British nation.
Second, the British economy has never had a particularly
high rate of growth. Instead, Britain had a long, steady,
sustained, but somewhat slow growth rate. Much of Britain's
economic advantage in the nineteenth century resulted from
their "head start" in industrialization and not in a fast
growth rate. As a result, when Germany and the United States
industrialized on a massive scale, their growth rate soon
swept them ahead of Britain in economic might. Third, social
change in the form of a growing complacency, particularly
among the managerial class, resulted in the failure of British
industry to innovate or modernize in the face of the American
and German challenges. Despite these dilemmas and trends,
Britain entered the twentieth century still commanding a
preeminent position in the world economy.
Soon, however, events of the new century would soon
sharply accelerate Britain's decline. Principal among these
events in their impact on the British economy were the two
world wars. World War One transformed Britain into a debtor
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nation and killed much of Britain's brightest future leader-
ship. The Second World War drove Britain deeper in debt and
left it totally eclipsed economically by the United States.
Then following that war came the great dismantling of the
British Empire. Although some have claimed that the Empire
was more of a drain than a source of wealth, it did take away
sources of relatively cheap raw materials at a time when
competition for such resources on the international market
was intensifying.
Another factor in the economic decline has been the
growth of the post-war welfare state and the power of the
British labor unions. The evergrowing demands of the welfare
state have taken away much of the capital which Britain's
nationalized industry needs for growth and modernization,
while union demands have driven up the costs of British goods
to a point that British industry has become inefficient and
uncompetitive in the international market. Finally the con-
traction of the British defense establishment has created a
special problem for defense industries, as the present
British forces offer an insufficient market to make extensive
research and development expenditures or large (and therefore
more economical) production runs practicable. All of these
factors have combined to make the British industrial and




The greatest impact of the economic constraints has been,
of course, that they limit the size and capability of the
British defense establishment. The extent to which this has
an impact can be discerned from Table One, which details total
British military expenditure between 1972 and 1981:
Table One
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
17,987 17,764 18,145 18,136 18,482
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
17,712 18,291 19,121 20,649 19,901
Note: Figures in 1979 US Million's of $
SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook
1982 (Cambridge , Mass
.
; Oelschlager , Gunn, and
Hain, Inc. , 1982)
,
p. 141.
These figures, which cover the period after the retreat
from east of Suez and the retrenchments of the Wilson
Government, indicate a 1981 defense budget only ten percent
higher than the 1972 budget. Yet, during this period most
of the equipment purchased by the Ministry of Defense has
undergone a real cost increase of between six and ten percent
per annum. As a result, the entire defense establishment
has shrunk.
Economic constraints have directly affected security
policy in other ways as well. Overseas military activity,
particularly in Germany, has become part of the balance of
payments issue. Also British security policy is affected by
98

economic issues with the European Economic Community. Finally,
the dependence of the British arms industry on exports has
affected the equipment programs of British forces as well as
its foreign customers. Economic constraints have dominated
British military policy in many ways.
Closely related to the economic constraints are the
political constraints which determine the distribution of
the resources which are available. These constraints have
steadily grown more severe as Britain's welfare state has
grown. Not only have taxes and labor union demands eroded
the financial underpinnings of British industry and the
ability of the economy to generate wealth, but the great
demand for increasing social expenditure has diverted away
much of the wealth that has been created. The British people
have come to expect and demand improved social services,
higher pay, and more economic benefits from a government and
national economy hardly capable of satisfying these demands.
"The British people have become less interested in the
security of their islands and their essential imports than
in their own immediate and personal welfare."
This trend is shared with other Western nations to
various degrees, and politicians find it very difficult to
oppose. "The budget constraints on defence expenditure are
very great indeed in all the democracies, with almost
irresistible pressures from electorates (on governments
anxious to secure a further term of offfice) to devote any
99

resources that may be available ancl even resources that are
not available but have to be borrowed to provide a high and
7
ever-rising standard of living and level of social benefits."
As a result of this political pressure, many politicians have
found it convenient to cut costs in other areas, such as the
military. "It is hard to resist the conclusion that there is
a long-standing and persistent trend in the political evolution
of the industrialized democracies which is adverse to be the
o
maintenance of an effective defence.' 1 This trend has been
particularly strong in Britain.
As a result, the relationship between defense spending
and social spending has changed dramatically. Whereas in
1955 British defense spending accounted for 2 7.4% of govern-
ment expenditure while social security accounted for 17.7%,
in 1980 defense spending was down to 11.6% while social
9
security had risen to 28.0% of total government expenditure.
This fundamental reordering of national priorities is
extremely difficult, if not impossible to reverse in a
liberal democracy, though the Thatcher Government has made
some progress in stemming the tide. Mrs. Thatcher took office
determined to reduce social expenditure while maintaining a
strong defense. In 1982 Britain spent 5.1% of its Gross
Domestic Product on defense, a greater percentage than any of
the European allies except Greece and Turkey. Yet even the
Thatcher Government has found some contraction of the defense
establishment necessary. As The Way Forward stated, "Our
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current force structure is however too large for us to meet
this need within any resource allocation which our people can
reasonably be asked to afford." The political dynamics and
realities of social democracy will continue to be a powerful
constraint on British defense spending.
Technology shapes the distribution of defense resources
in two ways. First, it defines what is achievable by investing
in a particular aspect of military capability. For example,
the technology of combat jet aircraft is such that they are a
potent air defense weapon, and therefore worth the expenditure,
while the currently available technology for laser beam
ballistic missile defense is such that Britain would gain
little from investing in such a program. Second, technology
accentuates the burden of increasing costs of new developments
on a military fully committed to "high technology." As
research and development costs of new technology increase at
a rate greater than economic growth, this commitment will
become more difficult to maintain, and some adjusting will be
necessary. In fact, the conceding of strategic missile
development for British forces to the Americans reflects such
an adjustment. Technology will continue to affect the
allocation of defense resources.
Other factors in the competition for defense resources
include institutional constraints which combine with habit
and tradition to shape some of the bureaucratic conflicts
fought between the three services and within the Navy itself.
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Although these conflicts are often waged in jargon based on
strategic or tactical terms, personal emotion and sentiment
are also frequently apparent. Until recently British policy-
makers have dealt with this dilemma by distributing the misery
of necessary cuts equally among the three services, but since
The Way Forward was presented, these conflicts are again
12
stirring. Institutional constraints, habit, and tradition
continue to affect Eritish defense policy.
Finally, the British penchant for "muddling through" has
had major impact on the allotment of resources. This has
come about as a result of the British determination to maintain
13
a force which covers the full spectrum of military capability.
Though this has led the British to maintain an absurdly small
capability in some areas, the effectiveness of such efforts
is never questioned. Instead, the policymakers merely insist
on retaining those capabilities and hope for the best. This
approach to defense continues to affect British security
policy.
B. COMPETITION WITH THE OTHER SERVICES
It is within these constraints that the Royal Navy must
compete with the other two services for resources. In this
competition the Navy has had some real advantages over its
rivals. Above all, Britain is an island nation with a sea-
faring tradition which has given first priority to naval
power for over 400 years, a tradition which is very difficult
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to cast off. However, the retreat from Empire and the post
war situation in Central Europe have left the Royal Navy
vulnerable to being superceded by the other services on both
strategic and diplomatic grounds. As a result, the Navy has
experienced both success and failure in the continuing
competition with the Army and Air Force.
One dimension of military power in which the Navy has
successfully competed for resources is that of Britain's
strategic nuclear deterrent. The Navy came by its role as
the service principally responsible for the strategic de-
terrent as a result of political and diplomatic expediency,
although economic and technological constraints had created
the situation in which the change took place. From its
inception until the end of 1962 the nuclear force was the
exclusive domain of the Royal Air Force and its V-bombers.
However, when economic constraints and concern over the
vulnerability of land-based ballistic missiles led to the
cancellation of the BLUE STREAK Program, which was to
ultimately replace the bombers, the British sought the
economical solution of purchasing the American SKYBOLT air-
to-surface nuclear missile. The resulting SKYBOLT Affair
and the ensuing Nassau Conference passed the responsibility
of the nuclear deterrent to the Royal Navy, when Britain
elected to purchase the American POLARIS system. Since then
the POLARIS force has remained in service and received up-
dates such as the CHEVALINE program while the VULCAN bomber
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force has been gradually phased out of the nuclear strike
role. The Royal Navy has become the sole possessor of
British strategic nuclear weapons.
The British Government's recent decision to acquire
TRIDENT as a successor to POLARIS also reflects economic
and technological constraints. The principal alternative
to TRIDENT was considered to be cruise missiles, launched
from either land or sea. Though a sea-launched system would
have left the nuclear deterrent a Navy responsibility, land-
based cruise missiles would belong to one of the other
services. In addition to the military considerations, strong
financial arguments were made for both cruise missiles and
for TRIDENT. For the cruise missile, the low cost of the
missile and associated launch platforms (compared to a
ballistic missile submarine) was attractive. However, the
counter-argument for TRIDENT held that a cruise missile
program which matched the striking power and security of
TRIDENT would demand such a quantity of missiles and launch
platforms, that the cruise missile program would cost more
14in the long run. Technological considerations also favor
TRIDENT, as ballistic missiles are much more difficult to
defend against than cruise missiles. Also, the British have
become comfortable with the POLARIS force, and institutional
inertia favors a similar force. Although these considerations
were not the only factors involved in determining the choice
of TRIDENT, they were certainly important. The decision
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keeps the strategic nuclear deterrent the exclusive role of
the Royal Navy.
The major battle for resources and money, however, has
been between the Navy's conventional fleet and the Army and
Air Force presence in the Federal Republic of Germany. This
battle has come about as a result of Britain's economic
dilemma, which has made the maintenance of both a balanced,
capable fleet and a substantial military presence in Central
Europe no longer feasible. Both sides have put forth con-
vincing arguments for their respective cases.
For the BAOR, the argument is based principally on military
and diplomatic grounds, with some economic reasons also
considered. The basic strategic argument holds that since
the main Soviet threat is in Central Europe, the best place
to confront that threat is Central Europe. Also the physical
presence of troops provides a very visible, and therefore
stronger, deterrent than would ships at sea. Diplomatically,
the case for the BAOR is even stronger. Britain is obligated
under the 1954 amendments to the 1948 Brussels Treaty, as
modified in 1957, to maintain 55,000 troops in Germany. This
presence contributes to keeping the United States Army in
Europe and therefore the American nuclear guarantee to
Europe intact. It also keeps Britain an active member in
the European community and keeps ties with the Bonn Government
close. A decision to withdraw the BAOR, or even to sub-
stantially reduce it, could set off a series of withdrawals
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among the other allies, particularly the United States,
greatly reduce British influence in Europe, damage relations
with the Federal Republic of Germany, and revive French fears
of a resurgent unfettered Germany. Economically, the British
voice in the EEC could also be diminished by such a withdrawal
These arguments make a very strong case for the BAOR's con-
tinuing presence in Central Europe, "Despite all the financial
pressures on our defence effort, the Government has decided
that this contribution is so important to the Alliance's
military posture and its political cohesion that it must be
maintained.
"
Supporters of the Navy counter these arguments with a
strong case of their own, based on military considerations,
tradition, and some economic reasoning as well. The stra-
tegic arguments for the Navy center around Britain's vul-
nerability to maritime interdiction, the serious Soviet
threat to the Northern flank, the great flexibility of sea-
power, and Britain's unique position as the strongest
European naval power in the NATO Alliance. This last point
also reflects the impact of tradition. Britain has its
tradition as a seapower first and foremost. Furthermore,
British leaders have historically eschewed a continental
commitment, and even today the very idea of an Army in
Europe is frowned upon in many Army as well as Navy circles.
Finally, the adverse economic effects on the balance of
payments of maintaining the BAOR have been noted as a reason
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for ending the troop commitment to Germany. The Navy sup-
porters, like the Army supporters, have made a strong case
for their position.
The battle was supposedly settled in 1981, with The Way
Forward . This document explicitly stated that the Navy would
be cut back while the BAOR would be maintained. As for the
Navy's future, it declared, "A rather smaller but modern
fleet with less heavy overheads will give better value for
defense resources." Although the Navy supporters continued
to grumble, the battle was lost. Then, in 1982, came the
Falklands War. This conflict offered a textbook demonstration
of the flexibility and value of naval power. The result has
been a re-invigorated pro-Navy campaign and the cancellation
of a few of the cutbacks already ordered. However, the
economic constraints and underlying principles behind the
previous decisions also remain, thus setting the stage for
another battle. "There seems little prospect that the defence
budget will be allowed to rise ever higher, so the conclusion
is that the battle for defence resources, which appeared to
have been settled decisively against the Navy in 1981, is not
only to be refought but that another turn of the budgetary
1
8
screw may force it to be even more intense." However, the
Thatcher Government remains committed to the BAOR. The Navy's





Recently, the Navy has also faced a challenge from the Air
Force for one role which has traditionally been its own, that
of sea control. Traditionally, the Royal Navy has been
principal guarantor of control of the seas around the British
Isles, while the RAF has played a very secondary supporting
role. However, with the reduction of the Navy's surface fleet
announced in The Way Forward
,
much of that responsibility has
gone to the RAF and its TORNADO strike aircraft and NIMROD
maritime patrol aircraft. This burden will be shared primarily
with the Navy's submarines. Thus the Royal Navy has proven
unable to effectively compete for resources even within its
own traditional roles.
C. COMPETITION WITHIN THE NAVY
Competition for scarce financial resources goes on not
only between the services but within the Navy itself. Although
the lack of public debate within British policy circles and
the small size of the defense establishment make such compe-
tition difficult to detect accurately, professional journals
and government statements do provide some indication of the
dissent over service policy.
One major controversy has surfaced within the Navy as a
result of the Government's decision to purchase TRIDENT. A
large number of pro-Navy supporters have expressed misgivings
that the financial burden of the TRIDENT program would fall
entirely on the Navy at the expense of conventional forces.
10S

In 1982, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, declared
the Navy was "being saddled with virtually the whole of the
19bill for TRIDENT..." This concern has led some navalists
to oppose TRIDENT on the grounds that the money would be
better spent on conventional naval forces. The Ministry of
Defence has even conceded that "...forgoing POLARIS replacement
would obviously make it possible to fund additional or
earlier force improvements somewhere else."" This pro-
conventional naval forces opposition to the TRIDENT system
has found many sympathizers within the Navy and defense
establishment
.
However, this opposition to TRIDENT has been rejected by
several defense thinkers who have pointed out that cancelling
TRIDENT would not necessarily divert those funds to con-
ventional forces. Furthermore, even if the funds were
diverted to conventional forces, it is doubtful that they
would have a significant impact. After conceding the pos-
sibility of diverting funds to those forces, the Ministry of
Defence went on to state that "...impressions that we could
sustain much larger conventional forces without POLARIS
21
replacement than with it are well wide of the mark." This
is because the costs of operating the nuclear forces are
very small compared to the costs of operating improved
conventional forces. Even the cost of procurement of Trident
has been estimated to average only three percent of the




six percent in any one year. Ultimately, many Navy sup-
porters have accepted the TRIDENT decision, but are clamoring
that the cost of the program be shared by the three services,
and not fall on the Navy's shoulders only. How the burden
of TRIDENT is shared will remain a matter of perception and,
as the program continues, so will the controversy.
Within the Royal Navy's conventional force, resource
constraints have forced great change and some competition.
These changes have affected force structure, ship design,
and the Navy's strategic focus.
The major change in the Navy's force structure which has
resulted from increasing resource constraints has been the
shift from surface ships to submarines as the Navy's primary
combat arm. This change is a result of technological
advance, which has given a tremendous advantage to the
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and has made the
surface ship seem even more vulnerable. "The power of mari-
time air systems and submarines in tactical offensive oper-
ations is especially apt and telling in our forward geo-
graphical situation. But, if we are to maintain and improve
these capabilities, we cannot at the same time sustain a
surface fleet of the full present size with its heavy
overheads, and continue to equip it with ships of the costly
sophistication needed for protection in independent operations
against the most modern Soviet air-launched and sea-launched
missiles and submarines.''""5 The extent to which Britain has
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accepted the shift can be measured by the fact that it is
the only non- superpower currently operating a significant
number of SSN's. The Royal Navy is changing from primarily
surface into a primarily subsurface fleet.
A second major issue facing the Royal Navy is whether
its surface units should be primarily ASW-configured for
North Atlantic operations or more general purpose in design
to meet any global requirements. Since the retreat from
east of Suez began in 1968, the principal theme in British
warship construction has been to meet the North Atlantic
requirement, though some general purpose capability has been
preserved. By the early 1980' s, the Royal Navy no longer
maintained any large surface units beyond the North Atlantic,
but British ships have made cruises beyond European waters,
including a show of force in the Arabian Sea during the early
days of the Iran-Iraq War. "These limited forms of invole-
ment can represent some of the most economical and cost
effective ways of protecting and advancing the United
Kingdom's interests outside the NATO area." In spite of
this, the Navy's ability to project any effective force
beyond Europe was declining until the Falklands War. Since
then, the Government has decided to retain some general
purpose capability, and has permantly stationed a frigate in
the South Atlantic. However, the surface fleet will continue
to be optimized for ASW operations in the North Atlantic.
Ill

Although many factors and constraints affect and shape
British defense policy and the Royal Navy's role in that
policy, Britain's severe economic constraints (further
enhanced by the political culture of the nation) have been
the overwhelming factor in determining both policy and roles.
It is largely the economic dilemma that requires the Navy to
be cut back to maintain the BAOR, surface forces to be super-
ceded in their traditional roles by aircraft and submarines,
and the Navy to give up part of its global capability.
Though the Thatcher Government may offer some prospects
for an improved economic situation, it is very unlikely that
Britain will be able to sustain a growth rate which will make
the present defense effort affordable in the future. Whether
the next deep cuts strike the Army, Royal Navy, or Royal Air
Force, and how they will affect the roles and missions of the
services remains to be seen. Nevertheless, they will have
to operate within those constraints. "The future of British
defense policy, like its recent past, depends fundamentally
25
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Today the Royal Navy faces an uncertain future. After
300 years of naval supremacy, the last forty years have
witnessed a massive and deep decline in the Navy's relative
capability and power. This decline has been a product of
Britain's changing role in the international system, and the
growing constraints on British defense resources. Likewise,
the future of the Royal Navy will be dependent on the future
role of Britain in the world, and on future availability of
resources for defense.
The future of Britain's nuclear deterrent and the Navy's
role in maintaining that deterrent seem assured, at least in
the medium-term. The present Government in London is deter-
mined to continue Britain's nuclear role, and is committed
to investing the necessary resources to insure it. The
choice of TRIDENT to replace POLARIS guarantees the Navy's
primary involvement into the next century. A political
undercurrent opposed to the nuclear deterrent does exist,
but its chances of gaining power in time to stop the TRIDENT
program appear poor at present.
Whether Britain will be able to afford TRIDENT is another
matter. Despite the determination of the Government and the
relatively small portion of defense resources which TRIDENT
would require, memory of the dramatic shifts in defense policy
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between 1964 and 1968 does not rule out a replay of such a
shift by the end of the decade, with TRIDENT as the victim
of a new cutback. Britain's economic future is uncertain,
but barring any major financial setback, the nation will
likely carry out the new SSBN program. The Royal Navy will
continue to carry out its role of providing survivable
delivery means for Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent.
The Royal Navy's future in the European area is more
uncertain. Though Britain remains politically committed to
NATO and collective security in Europe, the expression of
that commitment is built around ground and air forces in
Central Europe rather than naval power. Financial constraints
have made maintaining both the forces in Germany and a large
fleet very costly. There is some political pressure toward
making the British commitment to NATO primarily naval, and
giving more attention to the Northern Flank. The Falklands
War has served to strengthen this position. However, the
present Government has opted to maintain the BAOR, and any
shift to a maritime strategy is at present unlikely. The
Royal Navy will continue in its present roles as protector
of trans-Atlantic shipping lanes and the British Isles, but
it will be performing these missions with increasingly smaller
forces
.
The Royal Navy's global role also faces an uncertain
future. Both Britain's role beyond Europe and the Navy's
presence there is today very small. Politically, these
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geographically distant British commitments are far less
important than the European role, and constrained resources
make them primary targets for elimination. However, the
Falklands War has postponed for a time the final termination
of Britain's global role. Ultimately, the naval presence at
Hong Kong, the Falklands, Belize, and even Gibraltar will
likely be ended. But, for the near future, the Royal Navy
will continue to play a small but significant role beyond
Europe
.
The future of the Royal Navy is uncertain because the
future of Britain's political and economic role in the world
is uncertain. For over four centuries, though, Britain's
survival and security have depended on seapower. Despite the
great changes of the recent past, Britain's survival and
security today and tomorrow will continue to rest to a major
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